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Abstract 
The share of the renewable energies in the power market is steadily increasing. The 
penetration of the renewable energies has a strong impact on the power market, espe-
cially the variable energy sources. The negative correlation of RES-E in-feed and the 
power prices, known as merit-order effect, have already been discussed in the literature 
as well as some of the parameters that influence it. To the author´s knowledge there is 
no quantitative studies about the impact on the market prices due to the bidding behav-
iour of the renewable energies. As power systems increase in complexity due to higher 
shares of intermitting RES-E, is also increasing the requirements for power system 
modeling. With Germany as example, this dissertation seeks to discuss to what degree 
the impact on the electricity price due to the increasing RES-E share could be mitigated 
by optimizing the design of the support scheme. The results suggest that the sliding-
premium scheme have high potential compared to the feed-in tariff or fixed-premium in 
terms of savings to both the consumers and conventional generator side, considering 
that it keeps the income flow to the renewable generators constant. The main critic that 
is moved to the sliding feed-in premium is the higher initial costs due to the manage-
ment premium. The results show that the reduction of the costs due the variability of the 
premium still permits savings compared to the other schemes. Furthermore, the result 
suggests that the additional benefit due to the direct market, in terms of less price 
distortions, could be considered secondary to the higher risk of over-/under-
compensation, i.e. if is used a capacity reward mechanism, for the variable renewables. 
Therefore in the author´s point of view the optimal design should be a mix of open 
market and sliding premium depending on the technology. In the dissertation is also 
analysed the effect of the interconnection of the spot market with the reserve market. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
The scientific opinion on climate change is that the “warming of the climate system is 
unequivocal, as is now evident from observations of increases in global average air and 
ocean temperatures, widespread melting of snow and ice and rising global average sea 
level” (IPCC, 2007). “There is very high confidence that the average net effect of 
human activities since 1750 has been one of warming [...]” (IPCC, 2007). Unmitigated 
climate change would, in the long term, be likely to exceed the capacity of natural and 
human systems to adapt. Burning fossil fuels and deforestation are the human activities 
that mainly increase the concentration of greenhouse gasses in the atmosphere. Fur-
thermore fossil fuel reserves are finite, due to the long time that they need to reform and 
to the wide-scale extractions that started from the Industrial Revolution. 
The European Union (EU) made a choice to support Renewable Energy Sources (RESs) 
in 2001 with a Directive that concerned the support to these energy sources in order to 
create a level playing field (Lorenzoni, 2010).The EU has a clear framework to steer its 
energy and climate policies; this framework integrates different policy objectives such 
as reducing greenhouse gas emissions, securing energy supply and support growth, 
competitiveness and jobs through high technology (European Commission, 2013). The 
renewable energies (REs) need to be supported because the market does not provide the 
optimal level of renewables without public intervention. “This is due to market and 
regulatory failures: low level of competition and unfair competition with other fuels, in 
particular subsides for fossil fuels and nuclear energy, […] the incomplete internaliza-
tion of external costs (air pollution and energy security), rigid electricity system design 
inhibit the growth of renewable energy” (European Commission, 2013 a). The share of 
  
2 
renewables in EU shall reach 35% of the electricity consumption by 2020 and 60-80% 
in 2050, up from 23.5% in 20121. 
As the hydropower potentials are mostly exploited in many regions, biofuel-fired plants 
are limited by supply constraints and sustainability concerns, big part of the generation 
will need to come from solar and wind power. Wind and solar are intermittent energy 
sources in the sense that their output depends on weather conditions (Hirth, 2013 ). In 
addition to the fluctuation of the demand, the stochastic nature of the variable renewable 
energies (VREs) is increasingly challenging for the supply side of the power systems 
(Nicolosi, Fürsch , 2009). In a thermal power system2, with a high share of VRE, during 
windy and sunny hours, the VRE itself could lead to the drop of the prices, due to the 
well-known economic result that in oversupply situation the price decreases. Hence 
when the VRE generators have the possibility to generate the energy price is low; 
consequentially their rents are low as well. This can lead to an increase of public 
subsidies in order to increase the renewable share. 
The penetration of the renewable energies has a strong impact on the power market, 
especially the variable energy sources. The main impacts of the renewable on the power 
market are the reduction of the average utilization of the conventional fleet, the future 
investments on conventional technologies, reduction of the average market price and 
increase the volatility of the spot market prices. 
1.2 Research case 
Since Germany has a rigid thermal power system the integration of the renewable has 
even more severe impacts than to countries with a high share of hydro power with 
possibility of storing the energy. Furthermore, the German power market is the biggest 
                                                 
1
 The National targets for 2020 are formulated in ( European Commission, 2010), and the European 
targets for 2050 in ( European Commission, 2011). The historical are retrieved from (Eurostat, 
2014). 
2
  A Thermal power system is an electricity system in which the majority of the energy is obtained from 
the thermal conversion. These systems often have small possibilities to have energy storages. They 
are also known as “capacity constrain” system whereas a “hydro system” is energy constrain due to 
the hydro storages. 
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European market, when it comes to consumption (Nicolosi, 2011). Therefore, Germany 
is considered a good research case for study the integration of the VRE in the market, 
while keeping the subsidies costs down. 
Anyway since many other European countries have a rigid thermal power system the 
findings could be easily adapted. 
1.3 Objective 
The negative correlation of RES-E in-feed and the power prices have already been 
discussed in the literature, and this is known as merit-order effect. The volume of the 
merit-order effect is influenced by factors as the CO2 price, fuels cost, and the type of 
the conventional fleet (in section 2 is presented the literature review).  
Many mechanisms are suitable for support the renewables in the electricity market. In 
the literature seems that one important feature of a support scheme is the compatibility 
with the liberalized market, the more compatible designs are called market-oriented 
support schemes. The type of support mechanism influences the power market in two 
ways: different capacity installations, thus different renewable portfolios, and the way in 
which renewables participate in the electricity market.  
Recent studies, (Winkler J. et al., 2013), analysed the impact due to the resulting 
renewable portfolios in Europe. Contrary to the expectations the more market oriented 
scheme does not necessarily have less impact on the market prices.  
To the author´s knowledge there are no quantitative studies about the impact on the 
market prices due to the bidding behaviour of the renewable energies, therefore is 
considered important to fill the knowledge gap with an modeling study.  
The aim of the work at hand is to analyze how different support policies for renewables 
affect the power market in order to asses which could be the best way to support the 
RESs at the least public cost, on the example of Germany. 
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1.4 Used Approach  
As power systems increase in complexity due to higher shares of intermitting RES-E, is 
also increasing the requirements for power system modeling. 
This thesis was carried out with the Fraunhofer ISI in Karlsruhe. This research team 
developed a model labelled PowerACE cluster system that seeks to simulate the central 
processes regarding the trading, generation and distribution of electricity in Europe with 
several modules. 
PowerACE is an agent-based model implemented in the programming language JAVA3, 
the markets represented in the model include the day-ahead and reserve markets, but it 
also deals with other aspects of the power market, such as electric mobility and the retail 
market. Furthermore embedded in the PowerACE cluster system there is a capacity 
optimization module. 
For study the impact of the bidding behaviour of the renewable energies where imple-
mented a new part of the code where the support scheme can be chosen and consequen-
tially the bidding behaviour changes.  
Furthermore, in order to use it as input data for the model, , according the EEGs and the 
National Renewable Energy Action Plans (NREAP), a possible development of the 
capacity, generation, feed-in tariff support value, of the renewable energies, up to 2030 
in Germany were developed. 
1.5 Structure of this thesis 
The remainder of this report is structured as follows: in chapter 2 a general framework 
of the state of art in this field is given towards better understand the results that are 
going to be exposed in section 4, and the discussion of them in section 5.  
                                                 
3
 Java is a open source program, available at: https://www.java.com/it/download/. 
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Chapter 3 present the methodology used to reach the objective. Are explained in detail 
the taken assumptions on the input data how they were retrieved. Afterwards is ex-
plained the used model, and how it was build the new part regarding the bidding 
behaviour. Moreover, is given an overview of the used simulation scenarios. 
Chapter 4 presents the model results of the considered simulations, whereas in chapter 5 
the results are discussed and is evaluated the impact of the support mechanisms on the 
power market. Moreover in this section is tried to answer to the question: which could 
be the best support scheme for the renewables? 
Finally, chapter 6 summarizes the dissertation and the findings, the limitation of the 
analysis are discussed and possible future works are presented. 
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2 Theoretical Framework and Literature review 
This chapter aims to give a general framework to better understand the results that are 
going to be exposed in section 4, and the discussion of them in section 5. It is consid-
ered useful to recall some general framework of the German wholesale electricity 
market. Is given also a brief description of the support mechanisms for the renewable 
energies in power systems, with a particular attention on the support schemes analysed 
in the work at hand. 
The electricity is a flow commodity. The main characteristic which distinguishes it from 
the most of the goods traded in competitive markets is the restriction on storability. 
Therefore demand and supply have to meet continuously otherwise the line frequency 
deviates from the aimed value and could cause the break down of system´s components. 
Furthermore the electricity is essential for the proper functioning of the economy, and 
the electricity demand is extremely price-inelastic ( Winkler J., 2011). This characteris-
tic tends to make the electricity a good subject to high tax level.  
The electricity could be generated from different sources and with different technolo-
gies; i.e. from the solar energy or nuclear energy, but the final product is completely 
homogenous, therefore there are limited possibilities on the price differentiation. How 
the electricity is produced impact on the society in terms of costs and other effects 
difficult to monetise.  
There are some sectors of the economy where the demand and the offer by their own 
cannot ensure a reasonable balance of the interests of the parties concerned. Many 
reasons could lead to these unwanted situations, in economy are labelled market failures. 
Typical examples of market failures could be the presence of factors that cannot be 
monetised, normally called externalities, for instance the pollution cause health prob-
lems and environmental disasters that are difficult to evaluate in terms of additional 
costs on the product. Other failures are the possibilities for some participants of the 
market to exert their controls on the others, know as market power, or the presence of 
scale economies. The electricity sector is traditionally identified liable to the market 
failures for the special nature of the electricity and to the needs of high investments. 
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2.1 The German Electricity Markets 
This paragraph is based on ( Winkler J., 2011) and (Nicolosi, 2011). 
The German electricity market is Europe's largest, in terms of consumption (IEA, 2013). 
Since the early 1990s, as in many other European countries, in Germany the integrated 
monopolistic utilities were privatized and unbundled (Neuhoff K. et al., 2011). The 
market share of the four largest power producers is between 70 and 85 percent (Lise W. 
et al., 2008). The four big utility companies (EnBW, Vattenfall, E.ON, and RWE) are 
prohibited by the “Law against competition restrictions” to have a behaviour that leads 
to a not competitive market (BMJ, 2011). Moreover the transmission operators have 
been legally separated from the main power generators.  
The market is an “energy only market”, for instance there are no mechanisms to reward 
capacity. Electricity is sold at the spot market, in long term futures and forward con-
tracts. Moreover there is a balancing market in which the TSOs organize the ancillary 
services. 
2.1.1 The wholesale market 
The German wholesale market is composed of a virtual over-the-counter (OTC) market 
and the European Energy Exchange (EEX) in Leipzig. The EEX includes the day-ahead 
market and the intraday market. While the OTC market and the intraday market have a 
continuous trade, the day-ahead market has a single auction with a gate closure at 12 
a.m. on the day before physical delivery. At the day-ahead auction, generators and 
suppliers bid into the market for trading the electricity of the next day4. The bid price 
has a price cap of 3000 €/MWh, and since September 2008, the EEX has allowed 
negative price bids. 
                                                 
4
 The offers could be either of one-hour interval or a block offer, useful especially for the big thermal 
plants with considerable ramping cost normally called base-load plants, i.e. lignite and nuclear ther-
mal power stations. 
Theoretical Framework and Literature review 
9 
The market operator sort the offers of the generators from the cheapest to the most 
expensive in order to generate a supply curve that represent the economic merit of the 
plants, usually know as merit-order curve. The price settling mechanism at the EEX is a 
uniform price auction, thus the price is set by the last plant called to produce. Figure 2.1 
shows how is set the price in the day-ahead auction. 
Figure 2.1 : Stylized German merit order curve. 
 
Source: ( Winkler J., 2011) 
Although two third of the trading volume is settled via bilateral OTC contracts, the 
market clearing price of the central day-ahead auction is used a benchmark and refer-
ence point for the other electricity markets. This is due to the liquidity of the day-ahead 
market that allows arbitrage mechanisms . However is still possible that in the other 
markets the price deviate from the day-ahead EEX price, due to different level of 
information or to the risk perceptions. 
Between the day-ahead market closure and 75 minutes before real time, trade is still 
possible at the intraday market. Anyway, the biggest part of the trades is settled with the 
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gate closure of the central day-ahead auction. The intraday market lacks of liquidity due 
to the continuous trading. Therefore the resulting market price is not a valid benchmark. 
In the intraday market the traders have the possibility to balance their position, i.e. to 
react to unexpected variation of the demand or variation of the forecasted generation for 
the renewable generators. 
2.1.2 The reserve market 
The 75 minutes before physical delivery the responsibility to balance the grid is passed 
to the reserve power market, which is operated by the TSOs. Within this time frame, 
they are obligated to balance the deviations between supply and demand. The increasing 
penetration of the fluctuating renewable energies makes more difficult the grid balance 
due to forecast errors of their generation. 
The balancing energy is divided into positive and negative reserve. As in other Euro-
pean countries the reserve are distinguished as primary, secondary and tertiary reserves. 
Primary reserve is automatically activated and has to react instantly in case of frequency 
imbalances. The primary balancing energy is responsible for the first five minutes; 
afterwards the secondary reserve is automatically activated for the following 10 minutes. 
Primary and secondary reserve are also called spinning reserve because the generators 
that take part have to be operative and on line. Tertiary reserve are activated manually 
by the TSOs and needs to be online within 15 minutes, therefore can also be met by 
non-spinning reserves and e.g. by open cycle gas turbines with short start-up times. 
Primary and secondary balancing energy are auctioned every week, whereas tertiary 
reserve is auctioned every workday. Therefore the power plants that win the auctions for 
primary and secondary reserve are obliged to stay online for the entire month. In other 
words they are forced to offer in the spot market a certain share of their load to a low 
price in order to be on-line. The power plants that supply the negative reserve have to 
bring on-line a margin above their minimal load according to the contracted restriction 
in order to reduce the generation when required. 
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In order to participate in the auctions for balancing energy are required a technical 
prequalification and framework agreement with the TSO. So far, fluctuating electricity 
generation has not been integrated in the reserve market. The possibility to take part of 
the reserve market is becoming a relevant topic to increase the overall flexibility of the 
power market. 
2.2 The integration of the Renewable energies 
The complete integration of the renewable energies in the electricity sector is a chal-
lenge. As hydropower potentials are mostly exploited, biofuel-fired plants are limited by 
supply constraints and sustainability concerns, big part of the generation will need to 
come from solar and wind power (Hirth, 2013 ). Wind and solar are intermittent energy 
sources in the sense that their output depends on weather conditions. The fluctuating 
generation of the partially dispatchable generators coupled with stochastic variation of 
the demand make more difficult to meet continuously the supply and the demand, and 
the cost for balancing the system is expect to grow considerably (Klobasa et al., 2013).  
In recent studies, i.e. (Nicolosi, 2011), (Schill P., 2013) the residual demand is used for 
asses the challenging that has to face the supply system. The residual demand is the load 
that has to be served by the generators that are “active in the market”. Practically, is 
obtained as demand minus the supply generation that is not influenced directly by the 
demand, as the renewables generation and the “must-run” contracted capacity for supply 
the reserve. The capacity contracted for the primary and secondary balancing energy has 
to be on-line thus they are independent to the demand fluctuations. The renewable 
generation is usually subtracted from the demand because under the feed-in tariff 
scheme, the TSOs are forced to accept and dispatch the energy product by the RES-E. 
Under other support schemes, as the premium schemes, the renewables have to partici-
pate in the market. Anyway the VRE´s generation is considerable part of the demand 
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side because of its stochastic nature, whereas the dispatchable5 renewable generators 
could be easily decoupled to the demand side with more market-oriented policy than the 
feed-in tariff.  
The most important feature of an energy system to bear high fluctuation of the demand 
is the flexibility. 
2.2.1 The flexibility of the Electricity Market 
The flexibility of a power market is the ability to efficiently cover the fluctuation of the 
demand. The flexibility is an issue either in case of low or high demand. The market 
signals of to the lack of flexibility is the deviation from the usual variable cost based 
pattern (Nicolosi, 2011). 
The flexibility of a system is related to many factors: the capacity mix, the possibility to 
store energy, the interconnections with inter-/intra-national markets (i.e. the reserve 
market contract available capacity from the wholesale market thus the interconnection 
with the reserve reduce the flexibility, whereas the interconnectors between the coun-
tries could increase the flexibility of the wholesale market), and the design of the 
support scheme. For instance in a “hydro system”, as could be considered the power 
system of the north European countries, the significant amount of possibility to store 
energy makes the overall flexibility higher than a “thermal system” as could be consid-
ered the German power system.  
A power system comprising supply, grid infrastructure and demand has a particular 
level of flexibility, and every components has the own flexibility restrictions. Since the 
price settlement of the market does not take into account bottlenecks is not considered 
in the work at hand the flexibility restrictions due to the grid infrastructure  
                                                 
5
 Biofuel-fired plants, hydro power, and geothermal power are usually called dispatchable renewable 
energy sources. For the biofuel and the geothermal is understandable why the input is considerable 
constant. For the hydro power the output is dependent on the seasonal water level in the rivers. 
However, an analysis of published data suggests that the market value of the hydro power can be 
assumed constant (Klobasa et al., 2013). 
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In the flexibility of the demand side can be included mainly three factors. Obviously, 
the natural fluctuation of the load, but has to be considered that the demand is almost 
price-inelastic. The second factor is the capacity contract for balancing services. The 
last on is concerning the renewable energy sources. While the VREs may be included in 
the demand side for their intrinsic stochastic behaviour, the constant renewable genera-
tor has to be considered part of the demand side if they are for some reasons always 
dispatched i.e. the grid priority under the feed-in tariff. Higher is the variability of the 
demand side higher has to flexibility of the system to keep the prices in the normal 
variable cost base pattern. 
In the supply side the flexibility is determined by the capacity mix, the interconnection 
with other markets, and the possibility to store the energy. As in the research case the 
possibility to store energy are limited in the work at hand the flexibility due to energy 
storages is not presented in-depth, although the possibility of store energy could be an 
important factor to mitigate the technical inflexibility of the thermal systems and the 
fluctuating generation of the VREs. The capacity mix has a predominant role in defin-
ing the flexibility. Thermal plants are technically inflexible because of the minimum 
load and the steep decrease of efficiency at the partial load. Thermal Plants with high 
ratio of fixed costs on the variable costs, as lignite and nuclear, are called base load 
plants because they have to be operative for a long time in the year for recover the high 
fix costs. Furthermore, for preserve their life-time these plants should not do often 
ramping up or down as they are not designed for to it. These technical characteristics 
have a strong influence on the overall flexibility of the system. For instance, a power 
block of base load power is willing to reduce the generation to follow the price signals 
but is already operating at the minimum load, than it should shut off the power plant, 
before do it the operator have to taking into account the opportunity costs due to the 
possibility to restart the power plant in time for participate at the power market and the 
start-up cost. These lead to reduce significantly the flexibility of the entire system. As 
was explained the capacity held back for system security decreases the supply flexibility. 
Whereas the interconnections with international market could lead to higher flexibility 
when there is an international harmonization of the power markets. 
  
The flexibility of the system is important to mitigate the impact of the renewable on the 
market prices. One of the most know
average wholesale market price. 
load the system has just to supply the residual load, thus the price is lower. 
shows the, so-called, merit-
Figure 
2.2.2 Merit-order effect
Although the constant generators in case of more market orient
react to the demand, they represent a small part of the renewable fleet. The VREs are 
mostly influenced on the weather conditions, so they produce energy when they have 
the possibility. Therefore i
VRE supply it self reduces the price during sunny and windy hours by shifting the 
residual curve (Hirth, 2013 )
capacity of a certain partially dis
and thus its market value.  
Recent studies show that the impact 
overall share of renewables on the electricity mix but also by the 
n effects of the renewables is the 
Since renewables and must-run already cope part of the 
order effect. 
2.2: Merit order effect during windy hours. 
 
Source: (Hirth, 2013 ). 
 
ed support scheme could 
f the installed capacity of VREs is non marginal, than the 
. Therefore, in the same system, higher is the installed 
patchable energy source higher is the drop of the p
on the merit order effect is mainly driven by the 
flexibility
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residual system, the market interactions, fuel prices and CO2 price ((Nicolosi, 2011); 
(Hirth, 2013 ); (Sensfuß F. et al., 2008); (Winkler J. et al., 2013)) the impact of these 
parameters are going to be explained in the following. Furthermore in this thesis is 
shown that also the renewable support mechanism has a strong impact on the market 
prices in the periods of high VRE in-feed. 
Parameters that influence the merit-order effect 
The slope of the supply curve is the most important parameter that determines the 
volume of the merit order effect (Sensfuß F. et al., 2008). For instance, if the load in 
Figure 2.2 would be enough high to call the OCGT technology to produce, in this case 
the merit-order volume would be higher than the one show in the figure, because the 
variation of the price due to the wind energy is bigger due to the higher slope of the 
supply curve in the last part. 
Among others (Sensfuß F. et al., 2008) and (Hirth, 2013 ) carried out sensitivity analy-
sis about the fuel and CO2 prices on the merit-order curve. The parameters that influ-
ence the shape of the supply curve are: 
1. The capacity mix; 
2. The fuels price; 
3. The CO2 price; 
The flexibility of the conventional supply system influence the merit-order effect, an 
optimized system for the renewable has less base load plants therefore the supply curve 
is more smooth and the system has higher possibility to follow the load fluctuations. 
The fuel prices are a driving factor for the energy prices. The impact of the fuel prices 
on the merit-order effect is related to the impact of the fuel prices on the supply curve. 
Hence is difficult to asses a priori how the variation of the fuel costs could affect the 
merit-order. For instance, (Sensfuß F. et al., 2008) shows that the increase of the coal 
fuel price reduces the merit order effect, because the relative price between gas and coal 
change and therefore the slope of the merit-order curve reduced. 
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The CO2 price determines complex impact on the supply curve, therefore on the merit-
order effect. It mainly changes the slope of the supply curve in two different ways: 
1.Within the same technology; higher CO2 price increase the slope of the curve due 
higher importance of the efficiency; 
2.The CO2 price could move the technology up or down in the supply curve, hence 
the overall slope of the curve change. 
The lack of flexibility in the system coupled with the merit-order effect leads to the 
surplus situations, since September 2008 in the EEX negative price are allowed to stem 
the economic losses due to the increasing frequency of surplus situations.The surplus 
situations occur when the residual demand is lower than zero (for the definition of 
residual demand see Appendix 1). High share of intermittent renewable energy sources 
reduces the energy generated from thermal plants, whereas the thermal installed capaci-
ty is not reducing much (Hirt, 2012), therefore is expected that the frequency of over-
supply in the near future will increase. 
Oversupply situations 
The oversupply situations occur when the residual load is low, i.e. low demand and high 
in-feed of VRE, and the system is not enough flexible to follow it. The supply system 
has to react with shutting off or ramping down conventional power plants; when there is 
no more possibility to reduce the generation because the plants have to supply the 
ancillary services6 or to export, thus the system is in a firm situation. These situations 
lead to the negative prices in the wholesale market. 
Hours with negative price in the EEX  
For the normal goods the negative price seems counter-intuitive, whereas for the 
electricity the negative offer is a direct consequence of its particular attributes as the 
non-storability and the price-inflexibility of the demand.  
                                                 
6
 As explained previously also the base load plants are unwilling to shut off the power plant, so they 
likely they may be online as well. 
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In Germany, during the oversupply situations, before the negative prices the energy was 
cut on with a less efficient pro-rata mechanism, the negative price mechanism permits 
higher overall welfare and it mirrors the opportunity costs of the power plants (the 
reasons why the negative prices are more efficient than the pro-rata mechanism is 
briefly given in (Nicolosi, 2011)). The conventional power plant bid negative into the 
market when the residual demand is low and they cannot reduce the load or shut off for 
avoid the high start-/ramping-up costs. Also the renewable generators, active in the 
market, and supported with mechanism that reward the dispatched energy would bid 
negative. The negative price is not problematic per se, but is a signal to asses the overall 
flexibility of the system. 
High share of the intermittent renewable energy sources reduces the energy generate 
from thermal plants, whereas the thermal installed capacity is not reducing much (Hirt, 
2012), therefore their utilization decrease. The decrease of the average utilization of the 
thermal plants increases their specific capital costs. High share of renewables change 
the load curve of the conventional system therefore efficient long term investment 
decision are consequence of the market signals (i.e. the merit-order effect). Hence the 
optimization of a thermal system with high share of RES-E or without renewables has 
different result. These concepts are going to be explained in the following paragraphs.  
2.2.3 Effects on the conventional fleet 
This paragraph is based on (Nicolosi, 2011). 
In the short term the high share of renewable energy has the effect to decrease the 
utilization of the conventional fleet. For instance, in the lower right corner of Figure 2.3, 
is shown the load and residual load duration curves, in a system with high share of RES-
E. In the long run, considering investment decisions, this lead to a less profitability of 
the base load capacity, since they require high utilization due to the high fixed costs. 
The duration curve show all the load that was required in the year sorted from the 
highest to the lowest. In Figure 2.3 for the same load level the residual demand present 
much lower duration, and difference is higher in the lowest load area. 
  
Based on the duration curve is possible to obtain a preliminary estimation of the optimal 
power system. The upper right corner 
costs develop during the year for some technologies.
Figure 2.3: Residual system adaptation to the share of RES
The base load plants has high investment cost and low variable cost (i.e. fuel and CO
costs) compared to peak plants. The 
point of different technologies curves represent the utilization necessary to make one 
technology more profitable than the other one, hence 
point. With the load and the residual load is possible to derive an assessment of the 
optimal power plants portfolio
2.3).  
Another motivation to foreseen a different capacity mix of the conventional fleet is the 
higher variability of the load that has to be served by the conventional fleet in case of 
high installed capacity of VREs. The grad
of Figure 2.3 show how the total annual capacity 
 
-E. 
Source: (Nicolosi, 2011) 
abscissa shows the annual utilization
these are the technology switching 
 with and without the RES-E, (lower left part of 
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penetration of the intermittent RES-E. Therefore the system has to cover this situations, 
moreover the low flexibility of the base load plant force them to accept the negative 
price due to load valleys whereas more flexible power plants can avoid the negative 
prices. 
2.3 Support Scheme for the RES 
The market does not provide the optimal level of renewables in the absence of public 
intervention. This is due to market and regulatory failures: low levels of competition 
and unfair competition with other fuels, in particular subsidies for fossil fuels and 
nuclear energy, the incomplete internalisation of external costs (air pollution and energy 
security), rigid electricity system design inhibit the growth of renewable energy while 
such measures are necessary to correct market failures and achieve the desired level of 
renewables, public interventions need to be well designed and proportionate to avoid 
additional market distortions.(European Commission, 2013 a).  
Different instruments can be used to support renewables production in the EU: The 
most commonly used ones are feed-in tariffs, feed-in premiums, quota obligations, tax 
exemptions, tenders, and investment aid (European Commission, 2013 a).  
Generally the support schemes are differentiated between price-based and volume-based. 
In the price-based mechanism the price is set by the government, and volume of renew-
able develops according the cost-potential curve. The volume-driven mechanisms 
predetermine the price and the volume development. Many design options among the 
different schemes are similar, for instance is calculating the LCOE (see Appendix 1) 
which are used to calculate the support level in the Feed-in Premium (FiP) or in the 
Feed-in Tariff (FiT) schemes or to set the ceiling price in case of auction or tenders. The 
aim of every support scheme is to provide the right amount of support in order to trigger 
investments but avoid over-compensating the investors (Held A. et al., 2014). 
As Germany is the research case in the work at hand, the attention will focus on the 
price-based schemes as the implement support mechanisms currently used belong to this 
class. In price-based support schemes controlling policy costs and revising and adapting 
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support levels are two crucial issues (Held A. et al., 2014). Since the EEG 2012 (BMU, 
2012) the possible support scheme that the renewable generators can choose are the FiT 
and the FiP mechanism, in the following are going to be presented the main characteris-
tics of these schemes. In Germany, the burden for the RES-E support is passed on the 
consumers through the EEG levy the so called EEG Umlage a fixed part of which is set 
by the Government on a yearly basis (BMWi, 2014). 
2.3.1 Feed-in Tariffs 
In a feed-in tariff system the renewable power plant operators receive a fixed payment 
for each electricity unit in-feed in the grid. The renewable plants receive the tariff for a 
certain amount of years, and it is subjected to a reducing rate. Alternatively, the remu-
neration may be granted for capacity instead of the electricity generation in order to 
encourage the active participation in the power market.  
Based on the regulatory framework, the transmission system operators are obliged to 
offer the renewable energies which have chosen to stay in the feed-in system on the 
electricity exchange, independent of the price (Klobasa et al. 2013). In other words the 
RES-E generators enjoy the “priority dispatch” therefore the TSOs are obligated to 
integrate each RES–E unit generated independently to the demand.  
As the renewable share is increasing, the passivity of the renewable generators leads to 
many problems i.e. the overall flexibility of the system decrease, higher cost for balanc-
ing, higher volatility of the prices and higher frequency of negative prices.  
The main experienced advantages of the FiT are its effectiveness and low risk premiums 
due to the stable income flow that the generators receive. In contrast whether the tariffs 
are not adequate set to the actual production costs there is a high risk to have low cost–
effectiveness. The level of the tariffs is determined by administrative procedures. In 
Germany the tariff are based on the calculation of the LCOE. The tariffs are regularly 
reviewed by the Ministry for Environment (BMU). The tariffs are technology–specific. 
The tariffs are differentiated by many aspects, i.e. the type of the used energy source, 
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the year of construction, and the installed capacity, moreover the EEG includes many 
other parameters. 
The feed-in tariff compared to other schemes i.e. the FiP is less compatible with a 
liberalized power market (Held A. et al., 2014). 
2.3.2 Feed-in Premium 
The entire section is based on ( Winkler J., 2011),(Held A., et al., 2011),(Klobasa et al., 
2013). 
The FiP can be considered similar to the FiT, but leads to different behaviour and risk 
level for the RE plant operators. 
Figure 2.4: Revenue for renewable generators supported with different support schemes. 
 
Source: (Klobasa et al., 2013) 
The renewable plants have to offer the generate electricity directly in the exchange 
market. On top of the market revenues they receive an additional payment according the 
particular design of the scheme. The aim of the direct marketing is to create a voluntary 
shut-down order in order to reduce the over-supply situations. 
The main possible design options are illustrated in Figure 2.4. The premium could be 
fixed at one decided level (Fixed FiP), the value is normally assessed by long-term 
average market price forecast, and hence the generators are exposed to the short-term 
price fluctuations. This high risk that the generators have to bear leads to higher risk 
premium. Normally the support costs have a good predictability, but an unexpected 
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increase of the electricity price could lead to a phase of over-investment and consequen-
tially a steep increase of the policy costs.  
Another option is a premium with a cap and floor. The cap and floor is fixed as the sum 
of revenue from the market and the premium. The aim of the cap and floor is to reduce 
the risk for the generators and the risk of over- and under-compensations.  
The option that the German renewable generators have since 2012 is the Sliding Pre-
mium. Renewable generators can choose between the options every month. It is also 
possible to sell a percentage of the generated electricity under the premium option while 
the remaining share receives the fixed tariff. The plant operators needs to inform the 
grid operator in advance about these percentages. 
The German Market Premium Model  
The German Market Premium Model is a sliding premium model. The premium change 
according the price development therefore is a dynamic mechanism. Although the 
premium is changing the level of the support is stable. In this way the generators are not 
completely exposed the market price fluctuation, but the risk is higher than under the 
FiT. 
The premium is calculated ex post on a monthly basis. It is based on the difference 
between the feed-in tariff and the technology-specific monthly market value. The 
market value of a RES-E technology assesses the possible marketing revenues for the 
sold electricity by the technology on the power market. The market value is calculated 
as the income streams divided by the total generation of a certain period (Equation 3 at 
page 49). Coupling the premium to the monthly average of the market price seen by the 
generator eliminates the risk of the general market price development but still gives 
incentive to react to the hourly price development. 
In the German market premium is choose the market value instead of the easier market 
price because the fluctuating generators do not have the same possibility of the thermal 
generator to adjust their generation just on the economic incentives but they have to face 
even the uncertainness of the weather condition, and with high share of VRE is ex-
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pected that the price in the hour with high in-feed of renewables will drop due to the so 
called merit-order effect. 
Relating the market value of a variable renewable source to the average market price, 
the so called market value factor7 (MVF), is useful for assess the profitability of a 
variable renewable energy source to a constant one. 
The generators that choose the market premium scheme receive also a technology-
specific management premium meant to cover the additional costs of the direct market, 
i.e. IT-systems, personnel, forecast costs etc. 
The output of the VRE, is determined by the weather, hence their generation is concen-
trate in some period of the year. With the growth of variable renewable higher fre-
quency of surplus situations with negative price can be expected in the near future. 
Create a merit-order of voluntary RES-E shutdowns is one of the intentions of the 
market premium model. The aim is to reduce the negative prices and prevent the 
disconnecting or switching-off of the thermal plants for a short period, that could cause 
high costs and also technical difficulties (Klobasa et al., 2013). 
  
                                                 
7
 The MVF is shown in Equation 4 at page 26. 
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3 Methodology 
In this section are presented in detail all the taken assumption for the input data and the 
model. Furthermore is explain in detail the used model, how it was build and how where 
retrieved the input data. Moreover is given a detail explanation of the considered 
scenario. 
3.1 Scenarios overview 
The design of a support mechanism that require to the renewable operators to be active 
in the market influences the way in which renewables participate in electricity market. If 
they have the grid priority then no active participation is required, whereas if they are 
part of the merit-order curve, as the conventional plants, then the support influence 
directly their bidding behaviour. 
In the work at hand, four different policy designs are assessed. The first one, which will 
be labelled Grid Operator Trader (GOT), aims to simulate the grid priority of the 
renewable generators under the feed-in tariff, where the RES-E generation is dispatched 
by the TSOs. In this scheme the renewables are offered in the power market at the 
minimum price, that is –150 €/MWh, and therefore they are largely dispatched.  
The so called Feed-in Tariff policy design (FIT) aims to simulate a situation where the 
generators earn completely the tariff established in the EEGs8 but they have to partici-
pate actively in the market. This scheme is technically a fixed premium. 
The support mechanism labelled Sliding Premium (SP) aims to simulate the German 
Market Premium model (see Section 2.3). The renewable generators participate actively 
in the market and they receive a variable premium on top of the market revenues. 
The last modelled design aims to simulate the renewable generators that participate at 
the power market and they do not receive any support. In this scheme the renewable 
                                                 
8
 For the huge number of tariffs in the EEGs is used a simplify parameter labelled Feed-in Tariff value 
(see Section 3.6). 
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generators bid at their marginal costs (see Section 3.5). This design option will be label 
Open Market (OM). 
The policies are tested on four different background situations. Hence were run sixteen 
simulations, see Table 3.1. The aim was to simulate the impact of the bidding behaviour 
on the German Spot Market in 2020 in 2030 with two different reserve market designs. 
To do this, were analyzed the generation and capacity development of the renewables 
(see Section 3.3) and the conventional fleet (see Section 3.4), were assumed CO2, fuel, 
and biofuel prices (see Sections 3.7, 3.8, and 3.5.1 for the complete explanation) for 
2020 and 2030.  
About the reserve market were considered two situations. The first one, that will be 
labelled not flexible9, simulates the current situation of the reserve market. The genera-
tors in the reserve market, have to be online and operating in order to be able to ade-
quate their production for balance short-term demand fluctuation or blackout and to 
ensure adequate system reliability. So far, in the regulatory framework, is still missing 
to enable fluctuating REs to participate in the reserve market. The steam-flow thermal 
power plants10 have technically constraints (that are simulated in the model) regarding 
the minimum load. The minimum load is roughly 40% of the nominal load; hence the 
thermal power stations in the reserve market have to offer 40% of their nominal power 
in the spot market to a very low price to ensure that they can be online (in the simula-
tion they bid at the “minimum price”, hence they are always dispatched).  
The other scenario is named flexible, in this scenario the base load plants bid in the 
power market at their variable costs, and no capacity is contracted from the wholesale 
market. This scenario aims to simulate a hypothetical situation where the RE generators 
can be in the reserve market. The scenarios were label like this because of the different 
degree of freedom that they have respect the RES-E. 
                                                 
9
 Not flexible for the RES-E. 
10
 Also named base load plants. 
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In this section, is explain in detail the assumption use on the input data, which data were 
use for the simulation, and from where they were retrieved or how they were extrapo-
lated. Is also presented the basic structure of the model and the improvements on it in 
order to run these simulations. The scenarios can be summarized as follows in Table 3.1. 
 
Table 3.1: Scenarios Overview. 
 
  
Simulation´s 
base year
RES with  
grid 
priority
RES bid 
price
Share of 
RES-E
Convenetional 
Fleet
CO2 
price
Base Year 
for 
Weather 
Conditions
GOT Yes
-150 
€/MWh
FIT
No, direct 
market
FiT value
SP
No, direct 
market
Premium
OM
No, direct 
market
Marginal 
costs
GOT Yes
-150 
€/MWh
FIT
No, direct 
market
FiT value
SP
No, direct 
market
Premium
OM
No, direct 
market
Marginal 
costs
GOT Yes
-150 
€/MWh
FIT
No, direct 
market
FiT value
SP
No, direct 
market
Premium
OM
No, direct 
market
Marginal 
costs
GOT Yes
-150 
€/MWh
FIT
No, direct 
market
FiT value
SP
No, direct 
market
Premium
OM
No, direct 
market
Marginal 
costs
Biofuel 
price
Flexible
2030
35%
50%
Mostly base 
load plants
Mostly mid-
pick plants
Scenario 
Name
2020
Not 
flexible
Flexible
Not 
flexible
Lower 
Higher
2008
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3.2 The PowerACE model 
3.2.1 The base version 
Since PowerACE permits many different possible settings in the following the attention 
is mainly focuses on the settings that were used for the simulations. 
The current version of PowerACE cluster system seeks to simulate the central processes 
regarding the trading, generation and distribution of electricity in Europe. The markets 
represented in the model include the day-ahead and reserve markets, but it also deals 
with other aspects of the power market, such as electric mobility and the retail market. 
Furthermore embedded in the PowerACE cluster system there is a capacity optimization 
module. 
The base version of PowerACE focuses on an agent-based power market model of the 
German power markets. A detailed description of the model is given by (Sensfuß F., 
2007), a brief presentation of the optimization model is given in the following, whereas 
a complete description is given by (Pfluger B., 2013). The first version of the model 
was developed in cooperation between Fraunhofer Institute for Systems and Innovation 
Research ISI, the University of Karlsruhe and the University of Mannheim and was 
sponsored by the “Volkswagen Stiftung". 
PowerACE seeks to simulate the markets in several modules, which are implemented in 
the programming language JAVA11. The core of the model focuses on the matching of 
demand and supply on the spot and reserve markets. A simplified visualization of the 
structure of the PowerACE is depicted in Figure 3.1. 
Important actors of the electricity market are represented by agents in the model. The 
agents have a restricted access to information on the market, which they use to act 
within their means. These agents include for example utilities selling electricity pro-
duced by thermal units and storage devices and an aggregate agent is trading electricity 
from renewable sources. The agent that trade the renewable capacity represent the TSO 
                                                 
11
 Java is an open source programme., available at http://www.java.com.  
Methodology 
29 
that under the feed-in tariff support scheme was obligated to dispatch completely the 
renewable generation. On the demand side, an aggregated supplier bids a demand 
profile into the market. 
The model has a high level of technical detail and market rules. The generation side of 
the model includes generation from conventional power plants and RES, as well as 
production from pumped storage hydro power plants. 
Figure 3.1:Simplified structure of the PowerACE structure, before the changes. 
 
Source: (Pfluger B., 2013) 
Although the model is able to calculates hourly electricity market prices for 27 EU 
countries based on the core clearing mechanism of the cluster, these simulations where 
carried out just for Germany.  
The module proceed as follow:  
1. Storage facilities optimize their bids based on forecasted prices.  
2. If the interconnection with the reserve is established, than plants are contracted 
for the balancing markets. 
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3. The bidding for the regular day-ahead market takes place. 
In the simulations presented in this dissertation, the plants bid according to their varia-
ble costs (i.e. fuel and CO2 costs), although in PowerACE is also possible to include 
into the conventional bids also cycling costs and markups in scarcity situations.  
Whether in the simulation is established the setting for interconnect spot and reserve 
markets than the plants contracted in the balancing market bid a very low price into the 
day-ahead market forty percent of their available capacity in order to simulate their 
obligation to be online.  
All data used by the model are stored in MySQL12 databases located on a server at the 
Fraunhofer ISI. The databases store input data, and the general model control parame-
ters. In the input data is included e.g. historic weather data for electricity production 
from renewables as well as a historical hourly demand profile and conventional fleet 
technical specific are included as input data into the model. 
Interconnector capacities between countries are part of the model while national grids 
are not represented. In the used model version, the trading between the countries is 
considered exogenous. Therefore also the import and export of the electricity is consi-
dered as input, and is stored as well in the database. The international trade is 
represented as bids into the market. The imports are supply bid at the minimum price, 
whereas the exports are demands bids at the maximum bid price. 
The conventional supply database is plant-specific, thus every plant has its own technic-
al parameters. Whereas the generation of the renewable is divided just in aggregate 
technology-specific categories, for instance on shore wind or Photovoltaic (PV), 
therefore there is no distinction due to different locations, techniques such as higher 
towers. The curtailment of the renewables is possible only at times when renewable 
production on its own is higher than the domestic demand plus possible exports. 
                                                 
12
 MySQL is a relational database management system. The program is open source and available on 
www.mysql.com . 
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3.2.2 Changes in the PowerACE model 
Since the introduction of the market premium model, with the EEG 2012, more than 80% 
of the wind power have switched to this form of marketing, 39% of the biomass capaci-
ty is directly market and almost 7% of the PV (Klobasa et al., 2013). Therefore the part 
regarding the renewable trading of PowerACE had to be updated to follow the market 
changes.  
The renewable generation was completely traded from the class “GridOperator-
Trader” (GOT). The entire renewable volume was bid into the market at the minimum 
price (-150 €/MWh). The GOT seeks to simulate the grid priority of the renewable 
energies under the fixed feed-in tariff. The renewable generation profile is based on 
historical data normalized on the total annual generation. The curtailment of the rene-
wables is possible only at times when renewable production on its own is higher than 
the domestic demand plus possible exports. 
The code was modified towards to simulate the German market premium; therefore both 
volume and price of the renewable trading system were re-designed. 
Nonetheless this dissertation is about Germany, the new part of the code was imple-
mented for all Europe as the rest of the code. The core of the renewable trading algo-
rithm is in the class “RenewableAgentPrice” where the method 
“callForBidsSpot” (Appendix 12) go through the regions and the renewable 
technologies in the scenario for generate the hourly bid with the method “genera-
teHBid” (Appendix 16). 
Every region can have different support mechanisms. The type of the support scheme is 
a field of the class Region, and it can be set in the database. The “callFor-
BidsSpot” method go through the regions, renewable technologies in that region and 
the year of construction. “generateHBid” is a switch method that according the 
support scheme of the region call the corresponding method for generate the bid. In this 
way the code can be easily adapt, i.e. to new support mechanisms, with just adding a 
new methods, and adapting “generateHBid”. So far the implemented support 
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schemes simulates the German market premium that will be called in the following SP 
(Appendix 11), a fixed premium in which the premium is the feed-in tariff (FIT, Ap-
pendix 10), and the direct market (OM, Appendix 9). 
 
Appendix 9In a competitive electricity market, generators are incentivised to offer at their 
marginal production costs. If they bid at a higher price, they are in danger of not being 
dispatched. In case of a bid below the marginal costs, generators are dispatched but not able 
to cover their marginal costs. Since the operators receive the premium just if they are 
dispatched the premium represents a part of their opportunity costs. Therefore in the SP 
scheme they bid into the market their marginal cost minus the expected premium (see the 
PowerACE algorithm for the market premium in Appendix 11), whereas in the OM they 
bid at their marginal costs (see section 3.5), and under the FIT the feed-in tariff value (see 
section 3.6). 
In real market the market premiums are calculated every months by TSOs as the feed-in 
tariff minus the market value of the technology. As the renewable cannot know the devel-
opment of the market prices they have to forecast their MV. In the model this is simulated 
by using the yearly price forecast that is use also by the pump storages. The forecast in the 
PowerACE model is made as a run of the model without pump storages and the renewables 
are traded by the GOT. Then the renewable agents every month calculates their MV with 
the annual forecast. 
The feed-in tariff value, for the same technology, changes with the year of construction of 
the power plant and with other technology specifics, i.e. the installed capacity. In light of 
the variability of the feed-in tariff (see section 3.6), assume just a single bid price per 
technology was considered an unsafe assumption, thus was decide to split the total genera-
tion by the year of construction. Were not use other sub-categories because the EEGs have 
many technology-specific parameters that were not possible to integrate in the code, and 
was considered not really useful in term of quantitative changes on the results. For a 
complete explanation how were obtained the FIT value per year of construction see section 
3.6. 
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The total generation is divided into different year of construction according the installed 
capacity per year, the algorithm that split the generation is show in Appendix 15. The 
generation due to the capacity installed in a generic year is obtained as total generation 
times the installed capacity in that year dived the total installed capacity. 
The installed capacity per year is indirectly generated in the code from the total installed 
capacity profile calculated in section 3.3 that are used as input data. The algorithms that 
calculate the installed capacity per year are show in Appendix 13 and Appendix 14.  
The installed capacity of a generic year is obtained as the total capacity installed that year 
minus the total installed capacity of the year before. In case of a reduction of the total 
installed capacity than the value of the installed capacity per year should be negative.  
The capacity is readapted following the principle of “first in-first out”, therefore in the years 
where the capacity decrease the installed capacity is assumed to be zero, and the reduction 
of the capacity is subtracted to the previous year starting from the first one. Afterwards, the 
capacity is adapted with the assumed life time for the power plants, as usual, is assumed 
that the RES-E plants have a life time of 20 years.  
The installed capacity per year older than 20 year from the base year of the simulation is 
shift of 20 year. This method seeks to simulate the replacement of the power plants. Is 
considered important to remember that with this algorithms the total installed capacity and 
the total generation do not change, the only variations are due the numerical errors because 
of the floating  points.  
In Figure 3.2 is shown the installed capacity per year, and the installed capacity per year 
readapt to the assumed life time of 20 years for the on shore wind. The total installed 
capacity per year profile for the on shore wind is shown in Figure 3.4. 
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Figure 3.2 : Example of how works the algorithm for generate the installed capacity per year. 
 
 
Source: Own illustration. 
In summary the bid from the renewable includes a price and a volume. 
The price is influenced by the support mechanism. So far in the model where im-
plement SP, FIT and OM. 
The Volume is split in sub-categories of the year of construction, the division is 
made according the installed capacity per year. 
Compared to the previous version the model is much more flexible. For instance, with 
eight different renewable technology there was just one bid price, whereas now is 
possible to have 160 bid with different price and volume. 
3.3 Scenario for capacity and Generation 
For run the simulation of 2020 and 2030 was need to generate a scenario about the 
growing of the renewable. For do that were analyzed the historical data series, retrieved 
from (AGEE stat, 2014 ), in order to extrapolate a meaningful growing scenario, 
furthermore were followed the guidelines of the Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG) 
2014 (BMWi, 2014). The Renewable Energy Sources Act (Erneuerbare Energien 
Gesetz – EEG) promotes, in Germany, the generation of electricity using renewable 
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energy sources. The purpose is to achieve the share of renewable energy sources in 
electricity supply to at least: 
1. 35 percent by no later than 2020;  
2. 50 percent by no later than 2030;  
3. 65 percent by no later than 2040; and  
4. 80 percent by no later than 2050;  
The transformation of the energy supply system towards renewables is a challenge, 
especially for a thermal-based system, as is the German electricity supply system (see 
Section 1.2). For help the sustainable and cost effective growing of the renewable side 
of the electricity power supply, the EEG provides detailed figures of the planned 
increase of the installed capacity for the different renewable technologies. These growth 
targets are an innovation for the German support scheme. These are called “Expansion 
corridors and Breathing Caps”, according the EEG, the targets are summaries as follow: 
1. The On shore wind capacity has a annual net growth target of 2500 Mega Watt 
(MW); 
2. The Off shore wind capacity target in 2020 is 6.5 Giga Watt (GW) and 15 GW by 
2030; 
3. The solar power a gross annual growth corridors target of 2500 MW, with a cap 
52 GW; 
4. The Biomass a gross annual growth corridor of 100 MW; 
For hydro power and geothermal power there are no growth corridors, their potential is 
mostly exploited, and furthermore they represent a small part of the yearly generation 
were assumed that no new capacity will installed. 
The data from ( AGEE stat, 2014) were used as historical series for the capacity of the 
renewable sources. The renewable technologies that were simulated in the model are: 
1. Biomass 
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2. Biogas  
3. Hydro power 
4. Geothermal power 
5. On shore wind 
6. Off shore wind 
7. Photovoltaic (PV) 
8. Photovoltaic on the roof (PVR) 
For the calculation of the installed capacity were taken into account even the hydro 
storages nonetheless they represent a very small part of the installed capacity. The used 
report, (AGEE stat, 2014 ), do not follow the same categorization of the RES-E.  
The category of Biomass, in this work, correspond to biomass, biogas, bioliquid and 
waste in (AGEE stat, 2014 ) categorization, whereas Biogas correspond to landfill gas, 
sewage gas, mine gas.  
The reason for this choice were the similar cost more than the physical similarities. The 
solar technologies, in the used historical database, are all under the category Photo-
voltaic. For split the class into PV and PVR were used historical data of the installed 
capacity in Germany retrieved from the transmission system operator’s (TSO) web 
sites13.  
The assumed dividing line between PV and PVR is 1000 MW of installed capacity. The 
historical data analysis is shown in Figure 3.3; from 2013 to 2030 their shares are 
assumed to keep constant. 
                                                 
13
 The data can be retrieved in the TSO´s websites (TransnetBW, 2012) (TenneT, 2012) 
(Aprion, 2012) (50Hertz, 2012). 
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Figure 3.3: Share of PV and PVR in Germany from 1990-2013. 
 
Source: Own illustration, data source see footnote 13 at page 36. 
The EEG growth corridor of the biomass is spilt into Biomass and Biogas according 
their proportion of installed capacity in 2013, which is 51percent of Biomass on the total. 
The historical data, the growth corridors, and the assumptions enable to develop a 
capacity scenario, shown in Figure 3.4, for the precise installed per year see Appendix 3. 
For reasons of clarity, geothermal and hydro storages installed capacities are leaving out 
from Figure 3.4; although they were taking into consideration for the calculations. 
Figure 3.4: Installed renewable capacity scenario. 
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Source: Own illustration. Based on (AGEE stat, 2014 ) and (BMWi, 2014) 
For asses the future generation from RES-E in 2020 and 2030 were assumed that the 
total electrical gross consumption will keep constant from the historical of 2013 up to 
2030, the used value is 600630 Giga Watt Hours (GWh)( retrieved from (AGEE stat, 
2014 )). Nonetheless the EEG aims to improve even the efficiency of the overall 
electrical system this assumption were considered safer and it even lead to an easier 
comparison among the scenarios. 
As the EEG refer just to the total share of the RES-E and to the capacity caps and 
corridors, for establish the forecasted generation scenario, an overall analysis of the 
historical full load hours (FLH) of the RES-E was carried out (for the full load hours 
overview see Figure 3.5). The full load hours of a power plant are just the ratio between 
dispatched generation and installed capacity. The full load hours represents the number 
of hours that an ideal power plant14, with the same capacity, needs to run for produce 
the same generation. The historical full load hours were calculated with the data from 
(AGEE stat, 2014 ). For the solar technologies and the on shore wind is assume that the 
FLH will grow according the historical trend, the reason is the high possibility that these 
technologies will have technological improvements. For the high variability of the 
historical data for the off shore wind and the geothermal power, were chose to use the 
average of the historical full load hours, for the hydro power, pump storage, and biogas 
the FLH are keep constants up to 2030, the utilization of the biomass were calculated as 
the different needed generation for reach the target. The resulting FLH of the biomass 
are roughly in line with the current value (see Figure 3.5), which are an index for asses 
the validity of the considered assumption. 
                                                 
14
 Ideal means that the power plant has no losses in the conversion of energy and it does not need to stop 
for the maintenance. 
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Figure 3.5: Full load hours of the RES-E 
 
Source: Own illustration. Based on (AGEE stat, 2014 ) and (BMWi, 2014) 
Finally, the forecasted generation was obtained as full load hours times the capacity. In 
Figure 3.7, is shown the overall renewable generation mixes in 2020 and 2030. For the 
forecasted development of the renewable generation see Figure 3.6, for the used data in 
the simulation see Appendix 4 
Figure 3.6: Renewable generation scenario. 
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Source: Own illustration. Based on (AGEE stat, 2014 ) and (BMWi, 2014). 
Figure 3.7: Renewable generation mix for 2020 (left) and 2030 (right). 
 
Source: Own illustration. Based on (AGEE stat, 2014 ) and (BMWi, 2014). 
3.4 Residual load (the optimization model) 
PowerACE is a powerful model for the analysis of the electricity sector. It can be 
configured as agentbased simulation tool or as tool for the optimization of electricity 
systems in Europe. In this study is used in both the configurations, it is used as optimi-
zation tool to calculate the residual conventional system with the considered develop-
ment of the renewable in section 3.3. A detailed description of the optimization model is 
given by (Pfluger B., 2013).  
The optimization model seeks to minimize summed system cost. “Besides the central 
function to find a least cost system additional constraints can be integrated in the 
analysis. The most important constraint is that demand and supply have to be matched 
in any region of the model for every single hour of the target years which are modelled 
by 8760 hours. Other important constraints are CO2 limits, annual national self supply 
rates and minimum or maximum conditions for single parameters such as net transfer 
capacity over the entire time period with perfect foresight. Perfect foresight is a techni-
cal term for the fact that the model optimizes the system with full information on all 
data required at any time step and on all the consequences of the decisions on any time 
step. Capital costs of all investment options are included as annuities”(Senfuss F., 
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Pfluger B., 2014). Investment options available to the model include just power plants, 
interconnectors for electricity transport and storage facilities.  
“The objective function which determines the central target to develop an electricity 
system with the lowest cost possible within the given framework conditions, also 
includes the cost of hourly dispatch such as fuel cost or variable operation and mainte-
nance cost”(Senfuss F., Pfluger B., 2014).  
As input data or the model were used the PowerACE database of power plants and the 
renewable capacity calculated in the previous section. The model results gives the 
optimize system for 2020 and 2030. The result from the model are given in Table 3.2. 
 
Table 3.2: Simplified power plants portfolio. 
 
2020 2030 
 
[MW] [MW] 
   Gas 33,117 59,048 
Hard Coal 13,464 2,757 
Lignite 13,923 15,416 
Nuclear 20,242 - 
Oil 857 735 
Waste 1,734 1,472 
 
The results could be foreseen in light of the theoretical framework given in section 2.2.3. 
The capacity mix is substantially changed in favour of the gas technology.  
The optimal scenario does not reduce the total installed capacity and there is high share 
of peak plants, because of the reduction on the utilization of the conventional fleet. 
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Figure 3.8: Capacity mix of the conventional plants. 
 
 
Source: Database power plants PowerACE and Optimization model. 
3.5 The Marginal costs of the Renewable  
As usual in this kind of simulation (for instance see (Hirth, 2013 )) the marginal costs of 
the RES-E, a part of the renewables fired technologies, is set to zero. A better choice 
could be to use the long-term levelized cost of energy (LCOE), see Appendix 1 for the 
definition, instead of the marginal cost but the analysis of the LCOE is not an aims of 
the work at hand. 
 
3.5.1 Biofuel prices  
The biogas and biomass power plant operators has to pay the fuel for run their power 
plant. Therefore for these technologies the fuel cost is set as marginal cost. The forecast 
biofuel prices are based on (Held A., et al., 2011). In the simulations were used for 
Biogas and Biomass it was used the average fuel prices in Table 3.3. 
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Table 3.3: Biofuel ´s prices 
Fuel Price 2020 2030 
 
[€/MWh] [€/MWh] 
   
Biowaste -5.40 -5.52 
Biogas 13.07 11.05 
Solid 
Biomass 
17.19 17.80 
Average 11.01 11.15 
Source: Based on (Held A., et al., 2011). 
3.6 The Feed-In-Tariff values 
For simulate the bidding behavior of the RES-E generators under the FIT or SP schemes 
is necessary to simulate the tariffs and the premiums that the generators receive in the 
direct market (for the complete explanation see Sections 0 and 3.2). 
The tariffs that the generators get for the dispatched energy are established in the 
EEGs15. The tariffs that get the generators is technology-specific, therefore it could be 
seen as a function of many factors. It basically depends on: the year of installation, type 
of energy source, and the installed capacity. In the work at hand the chosen categories 
were: the energy source type and the year of installation. The resulting value in the 
following will be labeled as FiT value.  
For calculate the FiT value were used all the tariff from the EEGs15; of all the tariff16 of 
the same year and the same technologies were calculated the weighted average on the 
historical installed capacity. The share of installed capacity where calculated for every 
technology based on the EEGs versions, the data were retrieved from the TSOs web 
sites (the data are available in TSOs web sites (50Hertz, 2012), (Aprion, 2012), (TenneT, 
2012), (TransnetBW, 2012)). Nonetheless the data series of the installed capacity were 
                                                 
15
 The EEGs can be retrieved in (BMU, 2000) (BMU, 2004), (BMU, 2009) (BMU, 2012) (BMWi, 2014) 
16
 The EEG of 2000 still uses the deutsche mark, the used conversion rate is provided by the European 
Central Bank, it can be find in (European Centrl Bank, 1998). 
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not complete, the FiT value were calculated. The overview is in Figure 3.9 the data used 
in the model are collected in Appendix 2 (see in footnote 15 page 43)  
Figure 3.9: Feed-In-Tariff value curves. 
 
Source: Own research, data source: the installed capacity data were retrieved from the TSOs web sites 
((50Hertz, 2012), (Aprion, 2012), (TenneT, 2012), (TransnetBW, 2012)). The EEGs can be retrieved 
in(BMU, 2000), (BMU, 2004), (BMU, 2009), (BMU, 2012), (BMWi, 2014). 
3.7 The CO2 Price 
The assume carbon dioxide (CO2) price is shown in Table 3.4. 
Table 3.4: Assumed CO2 prices. 
 CO2 
prices 
 [€ /t] 
  
2020 19.95 
2030 39.89 
3.8 Conventional fuels cost 
The assumed conventional fuel cost for the simulations are collected in Table 3.5 
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Table 3.5: Conventional fuel costs overview. 
 
2020 2030 
 
[€/MWh] [€/MWh] 
   
Gas 29 31 
Hard Coal 14 16 
Lignite 4 4 
Nuclear 8 - 
Oil 48 46 
Waste 0 0 
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4 Results 
4.1 Introduction 
The model results are presented in this section, whereas in Section 5 the scenarios are 
compared and an overall interpretation of the results is given. 
The results are divided into Dispatched Generation presenting the conventional and 
renewable generation mix for all the scenarios. After that is going to be presented the 
Penetration ratio and Capacity Factor for the considered scenarios. For reasons of clarity, 
the results are divided into the year of the simulation and type of flexibility in the 
reserve market. This kind of division leads to an easier comparison among the scenarios 
with same base year and flexibility but different bidding behaviour. In Section 5, a 
comprehensive analysis is presented. 
The parameters that were taken into consideration for every scenario could be catego-
rized as general market parameters, and parameters more focus on the RE, which are 
labeled in the following as RE parameters 
As General Market Parameters is presented the annual and monthly average energy 
price17 (Equation 1) is defined as the temporal average of the spot market hourly price 
(ph)  The considered temporal horizons are the year or the month, so the summation in 
Equation 1 is extended either to the hours in the year or to the hours in the month (N). 
Equation 1: Average Market Price. 
  ∑       
€/MWh 
 
As a metric for comparing the variability of the electricity price during the year the 
minimum and maximum hourly prices are used, that occurred in the yearly simulation 
and the standard deviation (σ) is calculated as shown in Equation 2. 
                                                 
17
 The average market price has been also call system base price, time-weighted average wholesale day-
ahead price, or electricity price. 
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Equation 2: Standard Deviation of prices. 
   ∑     1      
€/MWh  
 
In the result is also presented the number of hours where the simulation clearing price is 
negative (ζ) . 
The RE parameters are grouped by partially dispatchable18 and dispatchable technolo-
gies. The parameters are divided because there are important economic differences 
between dispatchable and VRE technology. The dispatchable generators can adjust their 
generation on the economic incentives, whereas the VREs are subjected to the weather 
conditions. Biofuel-fired plants, hydro power, and geothermal power are usually called 
dispatchable renewable energy sources. For the biofuel and the geothermal is under-
standable why the input is considerable constant. For the hydro power the output is 
dependent on the seasonal water level in the rivers. However, an analysis of published 
data suggests that the market value of the hydro power can be assumed constant 
(Klobasa et al., 2013). Whereas solar and wind are considered variable in terms of 
output. 
As RE parameters the market value (MV) and market value factor (MVF) are used. In 
the work at hand, the market value of the renewable energy (RE) is defined as the 
monthly/yearly average revenue that the renewable generators can earn from the market. 
Moreover, under perfect and complete markets, the market value is equal to the margin-
al economic value that the RESs have for the society. Hence it is the market value that 
should be used for welfare, cost-benefit, or competitiveness analyses(Hirth 2013). So 
the market value and the market value factor can be considered good metrics to compare 
the profitability in the market of the renewable energy. The formal definition of the 
market value, that we use, is exactly the same as in the German market premium 
                                                 
18
 Partially dispatchable renewable have been also be termed intermittent, fluctuating, variable renewable 
energy (VRE), or not-dispatchable. 
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model19. The market value is calculated as the income that the generators earns from 
the market divided by the total generation dispatched. The MV is formally defined in 
the Equation 3. 
Equation 3: Market Value 
  ∑  · ∑      
€/MWh  
The MVF is determined by dividing the market value by the average market price. “[...] 
the value factor is a metric for the valence of electricity with a certain time profile 
relative to a flat profile. The wind value factor compares the value of actual wind power 
with varying winds with its value if winds were invariant” (Hirth 2013). 
Equation 4: Market Value Factor 
       
 
Source: (Klobasa et al. 2013). 
4.2 Dispatched Generation 
All the scenarios assume the same total and hourly distribution of the demand during 
the year. The availability for the variable renewable energy plants, as solar and wind, 
depends mostly on the weather conditions. In the model, the possibility to generate for 
the VREs is simulated by using feed-in historical data series normalized with respect to 
the total annual generation. All the scenarios use the same base year for simulating the 
weather conditions, therefore the VREs have the same hourly generation profile but 
scenarios with different base years have different total generation, due to the assumed 
different total installed capacity (see Section 3). 
 
 
                                                 
19
 (Klobasa et al. 2013) provides an analysis of the German feed-in premium model. 
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The differences among the scenarios could be summarized like this: 
• When compared to the 2020 scenarios the scenarios with 2030 as base year have: 
o Higher RES-E installed capacity (see Section 3.3); 
o Different mix of the RES-E (see Section 3.3); 
o Different mix of the conventional fleet (see Figure 3.8); 
o Higher CO2 price (see Table 3.4); 
o Higher fuel prices (see Table 3.5); 
 
In the scenarios labelled as: 
o Not flexible the plants that take part in the primary and secondary reserve 
sell 40% of their capacity in the spot market at the minimum price, and 
the rest of their available capacity at the variable cost; 
Flexible all the conventional plants bid at their variable cost; 
 
• The bid price of the RE generators changes according their support policy (for 
the detailed explanation see Section 3). The renewable capacity in the scenarios 
is labelled as: 
o GOT: is sold at the minimum price (-150 €/MWh); 
o FiT: according to the FiT value; 
o SP: according to the premium that the generators expect to receive (the 
premium is calculated as FiT value minus the MV and the fuel cost); 
o OM: at the variable cost; 
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Figure 4.1: Annual generation mix for the conventional technologies. 
  
Source: Own Calculation. The data are from the PowerACE model. 
Figure 4.1 shows the annual generation mixes of the conventional technologies. In 2020 
the majority of the conventional annual generation is produced by the cheap technolo-
gies (nuclear, waste, lignite, for their fuel prices see Table 3.5), whereas in 2030 the 
biggest part of the conventional generation is served by gas plants. The subtle difference 
on the dispatched lignite between flexible and not flexible scenarios in 2030 is due to 
the must run capacity. The higher generation percentage of gas plants20 in 2030 can be 
explained in light of Figure 4.2 and with the assumed conventional capacity mix see 
Figure 3.8. 
                                                 
20
 The oil and gas plants are usually labelled as pick plants because, they have higher variable costs, and 
better technical possibility to ramp-up and down, compare to the base load plants that are normally 
steam stream plants. Hence the pick plants are bring online when there is high residual demand. 
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Figure 4.2: Duration curve of the residual demand. 
 
Source: own illustration, data from the PowerACE model. 
As explained in section 3, in 2030 it is assumed that all the nuclear plants will shut 
down and the percentage of hard coal will steeply decrease as well, whereas the per-
centage of gas plant is almost doubled. Apart from the nuclear, that will be phased-out 
for politically reasons, the rest are results of the optimization model, so they are used as 
assumption. Anyway this seems to be a possible scenario because the renewables reduce 
the average utilization of the conventional plants, which increases the specific capital 
costs (Nicolosi, 2012), and the cheap conventional plants are the first that face this 
effect. This can be seen in Figure 4.2 where the duration curve of the residual demand is 
shown (for the definition of residual demand see Appendix 1). The duration curve 
shows the number of hours in the year where the residual demand was higher than a 
certain value. For instance, in 2030, for 30% of the hours in the year the residual 
demand was higher than the 58% of the maximum residual demand whereas in 2020 it 
was higher than the 65% of the maximal demand. This effect is much stronger at low 
levels of residual demand, because the renewable are taking the place of the base load 
plants, for instance in 2030, 20% of the residual demand it was request for 89% of the 
time, whereas in 2020 was necessary for 99% of the hours in the year. This leads to a 
lower utilization of the base load plants which have to run more hours to recover the 
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high investment costs. As peak plants do not face the same situation, this effect coupled 
to the high installed capacity explains the increased gas share in 2030. In the flexible 
scenarios with 2030, and in all the scenarios with 2020 as base year, the energy product 
from renewable sources is almost completely dispatched. In the not flexible scenarios 
with base year 2030 the constant renewable generators are often curtailed whereas the 
VRE are almost completely dispatched. For instance, the monthly dispatched genera-
tions for the Biogas and the Hydro Power are shown in Figure 4.3 (for the monthly 
generation’s chart of the Biomass and the geothermal power see Appendix 5). 
Figure 4.3 : Monthly generation of biogas (top left) and hydropower (top right) onshore wind (bottom left) 
and solar PV (bottom right). 
 
 
Source: Own calculation. Data source: PowerACE model. 
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As the output of the VRE is determined by the weather, their generation is concentrated 
in some period of the year; with the growth of variable renewables higher frequency of 
surplus situations with negative price can be expected in the near future. Creating a 
merit order of voluntary RES-E shutdowns is one of the intentions of the market 
premium model. The aim is to reduce the negative prices and prevent the disconnecting 
or switching-off of the thermal plants for a short period, that could cause high costs and 
also technical difficulties (Klobasa et al., 2013). The model results shows that the 
constant renewable generators react to the surplus situations. In 2030 they represent 13% 
of the total generation (see Section 4.3).Therefore they cannot exert a considerable 
dampening effect. As could be expected the generation in 2030 is higher than in 2020 
(see Section 4.3 for the penetration) due to the increase of installed capacity. Even the 
generation mix of the renewable changes due to the different installed capacity mix. The 
only factor that has visible impact on the mix and total generation of renewables is the 
priority dispatch.  
Figure 4.4: Annual generation mix of the RES-E.: 
 
Source: Own illustration. Data source: PowerACE model. 
4.3 Penetration ratio and Capacity Factor 
In all the scenarios with base year 2020 the REs are almost entirely dispatched (see 
Section 4.2); hence penetration ratios and capacity factors are roughly the same in all 
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the scenarios. The overall RES-E penetration ratio is 35.8% where 23% is from VRE. 
Wind power has a share of 16% on the total demand and solar power the remaining 
7.5%.In Table 4.1 the annual average capacity factors for the year 2020 are presented, 
which are roughly in line with current levels. 
Table 4.1: Capacity factors in 2020. 
Biogas 
Bio-
mass 
Geother-
mal 
Hydropower PVR SOPV 
Off shore 
wind 
On shore 
wind 
[%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] 
        59% 67% 25% 42% 10% 10% 18% 19% 
Source: Own Calculation. Data obtained with PowerACE. 
As expected, the constant generators have higher capacity factors due to their technical 
possibility to be dependent just to the economic incentives whereas the generation of the 
VREs depends mostly on the weather conditions. 
Also in 2030 the penetration ratio has almost the same value among the different 
schemes. This could have been foreseen in light of the consideration in Section 4.2, or 
from the small amount and similar number of hours with negative prices among the 
scenarios (see Section 4.5.2 and 4.5.1 General Market Parameters). The negative 
electricity prices occur when in the power market there is a surplus situation. Surplus 
situation means that the residual demand, demand minus the RES-E generation, is lower 
than the must run generation for suppliers of ancillary services21 and exports to other 
countries. So the small number of hours with negative price means that surplus situa-
tions seldom occur and this explains why the RESs are almost completely dispatched. 
Furthermore as the values are similar among the scenarios it is difficult to quantify the 
effect of the different policies on the penetration ratio and the capacity factor. Although 
there are small differences among the scenarios, the flexible scenarios always present 
                                                 
21
 The generators in the reserve market, have to be online and operating in order to be able to adequate 
their production for balance short term demand fluctuation or blackout and to ensure adequate sys-
tem reliability. So far, in the regulatory framework, is still missing to enable fluctuating REs to par-
ticipate in the reserve market. The thermal power plants have technically constraints (that are 
simulated in the model)regarding the minimum load that is roughly 40% of the nominal load; hence 
the thermal power stations in the reserve market, have to offer 40% of their nominal power in the 
spot market to a very low price to ensure that they can be online. 
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higher penetration ratios, because there is no capacity from the generators in the reserve 
market sold in the power market and hence the RESs are the first that are dispatched. 
The RE overall penetration ratio is 49.1-49.3% where 35.3-35.4% is due to the VRE. 
Wind power has a share of 26.5-26.6% on the overall yearly generation and the solar 
power the remaining 8.7-8.8%. 
The capacity factor increases of 1.6-2% from 2020 (the capacity factor changes are 
shown in Table 4.2, whereas for the capacity factor in 2020 see Table 4.1). The capacity 
factor depends on the plant availability, the technical efficiency of the energetic conver-
sion and to the possibility to be dispatched in the wholesale electricity market, which is 
related to the merit-order curve.  
The small growth of the capacity factor is likely due to the assumption about the 
working hours in section 3. The merit-order curve changes are lead by the coupled 
effect of the REs support policy and the different conventional fleet in the 2030. The 
renewable policies influence the merit-order curve because they affect the bidding 
behavior of the RE generators. The parameters that influence the bid of the REs are the 
fuel cost, the FiT values and the MV (for a complete explanation see Section 3, for a 
summary see Section 4.2). The capacity mix of the conventional power station fleet, in 
2030, is different from the one in 2020 (see Figure 3.8). The replacement with gas of 
technologies as nuclear, hard coal, lignite, that have lower variable costs, leads to higher 
average market electricity price (see Section 4.4.1, 4.4.2, 4.5.1, 4.5.2-General Market 
Parameters) and changes the shape of the merit-order curve in the conventional part. 
Table 4.2 shows the variation of the capacity factors for the VRE generators.  
As there is no clear differences among the different policies it seems that, at this 
penetration level the effect of the assumed changes in the conventional fleet have a 
predominant impact over the merit-order changes due to the REs, although the merit-
order effect due to a different support policy could be present at higher penetration of 
VRE. 
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Table 4.2: The table contains the variations of the capacity factor from 2020 for the fluctuating 
renewable technologies. 
 
PVR PV 
Off 
shore 
wind 
On 
shore 
wind 
 
[%] [%] [%] [%] 
     FiT 
    
Flexible 1.7 1.7 1.4 2.0 
Not 
flexible 
1.7 1.6 1.4 1.9 
GOT 
    
Flexible 1.7 1.7 1.4 2.0 
Not 
flexible 
1.7 1.7 1.4 2.0 
OM 
    
Flexible 1.7 1.7 1.4 2.0 
Not 
flexible 
1.7 1.7 1.4 1.9 
SP 
    
Flexible 1.7 1.7 1.4 2.0 
Not 
flexible 
1.7 1.6 1.4 1.9 
Source: Own research. 
The variation of the capacity factors from 2020 to 2030 of the dispatchable generators 
are shown in Table 4.3. The value is always between -0.1 and 1.2%. The reduction of 
the utilization of the dispatchable generators is because they adjust their production 
when a surplus situations occurs in the power market (see Section 4.2)  
Table 4.3: The table contains the variation from 2020 of the capacity factor for the constant renewable 
technologies. 
 
Biogas Biomass Geothermal 
Hydro 
Power 
 
[%] [%] [%] [%] 
FiT 
Flexible 
0.9 0.7 0.0 0.6 
FiT Not 
Flexible 
0.0 0.7 0.0 0.4 
GOT 
Flexible 
1.2 0.7 0.0 0.6 
GOT  Not 
flexible 
1.2 0.7 0.0 0.6 
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OM  
Flexible 
1.0 0.5 0.0 0.6 
OM  Not 
flexible 
0.4 -0.2 0.0 0.6 
SP 
Flexible 
0.8 0.7 0.0 0.6 
SP Not 
flexible 
-0.1 0.6 0.0 0.4 
Source: Own calculation. Data obtained with PowerACE. 
4.4 Simulation results of the year 2020 
4.4.1 Not flexible scenario 
General Market Parameters 
In Table 4.4 are collected the general market parameters from the simulation with not 
flexible scenario in 2020. 
Table 4.4: General market results from the simulation with not flexible scenario, year 2020. 
Support 
Scheme 
Average 
Market 
Price 
Maximum 
Price 
Minimum 
Price 
Standard 
Deviation 
Negative 
price 
Hours 
 [€/MWh] [€/MWh] [€/MWh] [€/MWh] [hours] 
 
     
FIT 52.373 85.2 -69.2 19.089 2 
GOT 52.355 85.2 -150.0 19.247 2 
OM 52.392 85.2 11.0 19.013 0 
SP 52.384 85.2 -20.4 19.035 2 
Source: Own calculation. Data Source: Power-ACE model.  
All the support mechanisms present the same evolution of the monthly average market 
price during the year (Figure 4.5). Every scenario´s price curve has the same shape but 
their positions on the graph are shift according the yearly average market price. As can 
be seen in Table 4.4, the schemes present subtle differences in the yearly market price 
(from the lower yearly average market price to highest is just 0.04 €/MWh). Hence in 
the following is shown just the yearly evolution of the spot market price for the Sliding 
Premium scheme (see Figure 4.5). 
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Figure 4.5: Yearly price evolution for the simulation in year 2020. 
 
 
Source: Own calculation. Data Source: Power-ACE model. 
In the light of the RES-E bidding behavior algorithms (see Appendix 9, Appendix 10, 
Appendix 11) it could have been foreseen that the OM scheme presents the highest 
yearly average market price. The OM algorithm sets the generator´s bid price at their 
marginal cost, which cannot be negative, instead of the other schemes that normally bid 
in the market at negative price. The lower average market price is set by the GOT 
scheme, due to its bid price that always is -150 €/MWh. 
As explained above, the REs supported by the OM scheme bid at their marginal cost in 
the spot market. The marginal cost for a VRE is assumed to be 0 €/MWh, and for the 
biofuel-fired plants is the assumed equal to their fuel cost (see Biofuel prices). Whereas, 
the RES-E normally bids in the power market at negative price when they are supported 
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by the other support schemes22  (see Appendix 9, Appendix 10, Appendix 11 ),the 
conventional plants bid at their variable cost, where the cheap base-load technologies, as 
nuclear and lignite, are bidding close to the RES-E marginal costs (see Table 3.5). In 
2020 the majority of the conventional load is served by the base load generators (see 
Section 4.2). Considering these aspects, it becomes clear why the OM scheme presents 
the smallest Standard Deviation followed by the Sliding Premium (0.1% higher than the 
OM), Feed in Tariff (0.4% higher than the OM) and the Grid Operator Trader (1.2% 
higher than the OM). 
The number of hours with a negative price can be used as a qualitative parameter to 
asses how many times the renewable generators are setting the price in the spot market, 
because, as is explained above, the RE generators are the only generators bidding at 
negative price (also the must run capacity bid at negative price but normally the demand 
is not that low to call just the “must run” of the reserve). 
In this scenario, the different support mechanisms have small impact on the general 
market parameters (see Table 4.4). The impact is difficult to be assessed because the 
renewable are seldom setting the price (see hours with negative price in Table 4.4). 
Therefore the market is little affected by the different bidding behaviors of the RES-E. 
This may be due to the small share of RES-E in the power market compared to the 
conventional generation (see Section 4.3). 
The minimum prices show better the impact of the different RES bidding behaviour on 
the market prices. The lowest clearing price present is from the Grid Operator Trader 
scheme and is -150 Euro per Mega Watt Hour (€/MWh), that means that it was a RES 
to set the price. The next lower price is set by the FIT scheme (roughly 46% of the GOT 
scheme) followed by the SP (14%) and OM with a positive value of 11€/MWh. With a 
difference of 161€, on the clearing price this hour clearly shows the deep difference in 
how differently the RE generators bid in the market if supported in a different way. In 
                                                 
22
 In the SP scenario the bid price could even be positive because is also function of the MV and 
marginal costs. The RES generators have a positive bid price when the MV plus the marginal cost is 
higher than the FIT value. This may happen for the Biogas and Biomass but they represent a small 
part of the RESs. Hence, even for the SP scenario bid from the RESs have mostly negative price. 
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the Feed in Tariff (FIT) scheme the minimum price is reached just once, whereas in the 
other schemes the minimum clearing price is reached twice.  
This is due to the fact that the different support scheme generate different merit order 
and consequently they brought on line different RES. For instance, in Appendix 6 and 
Appendix 7, is shown the generation dispatched outlook in the hours where is reached 
the minimum price for the FIT and Sliding Premium (SP) scenarios.  
In this hour the FIT scenario brought online biogas and more hydro power, compared to 
the SP scenario, in the same hour. The hourly generation of the biogas and part of the 
hydropower, produced in the FIT scenario, is entirely supplied by the Solar Photovoltaic 
Power (PV) in the SP scenario.  
In the FIT scenario23, is dispatched more Hydro Power in place of the PV because for 
some years his FIT value is higher than the PV´s FIT value (see Figure 3.9); the biogas 
has never higher FIT value than the PV but from 2000 up to 2003 the Biogas FIT value 
coincide to the Hydro Power FIT value, so probably the Biogas was brought online only 
by coincidence. In the Open Market (OM) scheme the Biogas is dispatched as in the 
FIT scheme and furthermore even waste24 is dispatched.  
The price is set by either the Biomass or Biogas, as the most expensive technology 
dispatched in these hours, see Appendix 8, moreover the price correspond exactly to the 
Bio-fuel price that is assumed to be equal to his marginal cost (see Section 3.5.1). 
RE Parameters  
Annual Market Value  
The annual MV of the constant generators is shown in Table 4.5. 
                                                 
23
 In the FIT bidding behaviour the marginal costs (MC) are not considered (see Appendix 10: Bidding 
behaviour algorithm for the RE bidder supported by the Feed in Tariff mechanism.) 
24
 The marginal cost of the Waste technology, in the simulation, is assumed equal to 0 €/MWh. 
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Table 4.5: Annual MV of the RE dispatchable, not flexible scenario, year 2020. 
Support 
Scheme 
Biogas Biomass Geothermal Hydropower 
 
[€/MWh] [€/MWh] [€/MWh] [€/MWh] 
     FIT 52.38 52.35 52.35 52.35 
GOT 52.33 52.33 52.33 52.33 
OM 52.37 52.37 52.37 52.37 
SP 52.38 52.36 52.36 52.36 
Source: Own calculation. Data source: PowerACE model. 
The annual market value of the VRE is shown in Table 4.6; whereas the monthly MVs 
are shown in Figure 4.6.The MV are presented just for one scheme because they are 
really similar among the different scenarios. 
Table 4.6: Annual MV of the RE partially dispatchable, not flexible scenario, year 2020. Own calculation. 
Data source: PowerACE model 
Support 
Scheme 
PVR PV 
Off shore 
wind 
On shore 
wind 
 
[€/MWh] [€/MWh] [€/MWh] [€/MWh] 
     
FIT 44.8684 44.8710 49.1973 47.4620 
GOT 44.7615 44.7615 49.1515 47.4181 
OM 44.9715 44.9715 49.2414 47.5043 
SP 44.9310 44.9310 49.2241 47.4877 
Figure 4.6: Monthly MV 2020, Own calculation. Data obtained with PowerACE. 
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The monthly wind value follows the shape of the monthly average market price but all 
the values are shifted down (see Figure 4.5). This means that when the wind is produc-
ing the spot market prices are low. The distortions from the monthly energy price are 
due to the moment when the generators feed-in the energy, in other words, to generation 
profile. The PV has more “peaky” generation compared to the wind. In fact, the solar 
MV value drops down deeply during the summer, because the yearly solar generation is 
mostly concentrated in that period. Furthermore, the solar value is more sensible to the 
penetration rate because its production has even a daily periodicity, due to solar irradia-
tion nature (see Figure 4.7, that leads to have high generation in few hours, where 
consequentially the price drops down and hours without any production. 
Figure 4.7: Solar normalized generation profile of the first week of July. 
 
Source: Own illustration. 
Annual Market Value Factor 
As was introduced, the market value factor of the dispatchable sources is close to 1 (see 
Table 4.7) because they are able to adjust their production based on the economic 
incentives. 
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Table 4.7: Annual MVF of the RE dispatchable, not flexible scenario, year 2020. 
Support 
Scheme 
Biogas Biomass Geothermal Hydro 
Power 
 [-] [-] [-] [-] 
     
FIT 1.0005 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
GOT 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
OM 1.0001 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
SP 1.0003 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Source: Own Research. 
Whereas the MVF of the fluctuating REs is lower than 1 there is no clear result about 
the effect of the different bidding behaviour on the MVF. The SP scheme presents 
higher MVF compare to the FiT, but the differences are at the third digit after the 
decimal point, so they are not very relevant. 
Table 4.8: Annual MVF of the RE partially dispatchable, not flexible scenario, year 2020. 
Support 
Scheme 
PVR PV 
Off shore 
wind 
On shore 
wind 
 
[-] [-] [-] [-] 
     FIT 0.8571 0.8571 0.9398 0.9066 
GOT 0.8553 0.8553 0.9392 0.9061 
OM 0.8587 0.8587 0.9403 0.9071 
SP 0.8581 0.8581 0.9401 0.9069 
Source: Own Research. 
The MV is the weighted average of the spot electricity prices, where the weight is the 
hourly generation of the considered technology. It expresses the “average market price” 
seen from the considered technology, or in other words the value of the wind in the 
market. Whereas, the MVF, is the weighted average of the relative prices, where the 
base price is the average market price. Therefore the MVF is useful to asses whether the 
considered technology is producing in hours where the price is high. The monthly MVF 
of the wind (Figure 4.8) present a different shape from its MV (see Figure 4.6). This 
means that when the wind is dispatched the energy market price deviates from the 
monthly average. The wind generation is high from October to March, but from January 
to March is decreasing and from September to December is increasing. Looking at the 
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Figure 4.8 it can be noticed that distortion of the MVF curve from the wind value curve 
is exactly the opposite. The maximum monthly wind value occurs when there is the 
minimum wind generation and vice versa. This means that the feed-in of the wind 
power involves the price to deviate from its monthly average. This result it was ex-
pected from the literature, and shows that the high in-feed of VREs leads to reduce their 
MVF their self. 
Figure 4.8: Monthly MVF of the VREs, not flexible scenario 2020. 
 
Source: Own Calculation. Data Source: PowerACE model. 
For the solar power the distortion in shape from the solar value is smaller. This means 
that the hourly price when the solar technologies are producing is in line with the 
monthly average market price.  
The annual solar MVF is lower than the monthly value curve. The reason why the 
annual solar MVF is shift from the monthly curve could be easily understand in light of 
the Equation 5. 
Equation 5: Annual MVF. 
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The annual MVF, differently from the MV, is not the weighted average of the monthly 
MVF. In other words, annual and monthly MVF are weighted averages of relative 
prices with different base prices. The fact that the annual MVF is lower than the 
monthly curve means that big part of the solar generation was produced when the 
average market price was low. 
 
4.4.2 Flexible Scenario 
General Market Parameters 
In Table 4.9 are collected the General Market Parameters from the flexible scenario 
simulation in 2020. 
In this simulation there is no clear result regarding the impact of the considered different 
mechanism for supporting the RE in the electricity market (see Table 4.9).This is due to 
the coupled effect of the assumption of flexibility and to the fact that, in 2020, the share 
of the RES in the electricity market is supposed to be quite small. The effect of these 
two assumption leads to the fact that the RE are always dispatched and, in this case, 
they are never the last technology called to produce; that means that they never set the 
market price. These results could be expected in the light of the few hours with negative 
prices from the simulation with not flexible scenario in the same year (see Section 4.4.1 
General Market Parameters Table 4.4). 
Even if is not possible a comparison between the different policy impact is still possible 
to compare the results as flexible and not flexible scenarios (see Section 5) 
Table 4.9: General market results from the simulation with flexible scenario, year 2020. 
Support 
Scheme  
Average 
Market 
Price 
Maximum 
Price 
Minimum 
Price 
Standard 
Deviation 
Negative 
price 
Hours 
 [€/MWh] [€/MWh] [€/MWh] [€/MWh] [hours] 
      
FIT 56.649 85.2 24.2 15.511 0 
GOT 56.649 85.2 24.2 15.511 0 
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OM 56.649 85.2 24.2 15.511 0 
SP 56.649 85.2 24.2 15.511 0 
Source: Own Research. 
RE Parameters 
In light of what is discussed in the Section sopra the RE parameters will be presented 
just once, without any reference to the support mechanism, because the results are the 
same for all the schemes. Furthermore, even the monthly evolution and the comments of 
the MV and MVF are not presented because has the same evolution of the not flexible 
scenarios but they are shift according the value in the following tables (see Section 
4.4.1). 
Annual Market Value 
Table 4.10: Annual MV of the RE dispatchable, flexible scenario, year 2020. 
Biogas Biomass Geothermal Hydro Power 
[€/MWh] [€/MWh] [€/MWh] [€/MWh] 
    
56.6303 56.6303 56.6303 56.6303 
Source: Own Research. 
Table 4.11: Annual MV of the RE partially dispatchable, flexible scenario, year 2020. 
PVR PV Off shore wind On shore wind 
[€/MWh] [€/MWh] [€/MWh] [€/MWh] 
    
50.2162 50.2162 54.1010 52.8081 
Source: Own Research. 
Annual Market Value Factor 
Table 4.12: Annual MVF of the RE dispatchable, flexible scenario, year 2020, Own calculation. 
Biogas Biomass Geothermal Hydro Power 
[-] [-] [-] [-] 
    
1 1 1 1 
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Table 4.13: Annual MVF of the RE partially dispatchable, flexible scenario, year 2020. 
PVR PV Off shore wind On shore wind 
[-] [-] [-] [-] 
    0.8867 0.8867 0.9553 0.9325 
Source: Own Research. 
4.5 Simulation Results of the Year 2030 
4.5.1 Not Flexible scenario 
General Market Parameters 
Table 4.14: General Market parameters, 2030 not flexible scenario. 
Support 
Scheme 
Average 
Market 
Price 
Maximum 
Price 
Minimum 
Price 
Standard 
Deviation 
Negative 
price 
Hours 
 
[€/MWh] [€/MWh] [€/MWh] [€/MWh] [hours] 
      
FIT 67.88 100 -83 23.5 173 
GOT 66.48 100 -150 32.6 173 
OM 69.62 100 0 13.8 0 
SP 69.12 100 -30 16.4 159 
Source: Data retrieved with PowerACE. 
In Table 4.14, the general market parameters are presented. In 2030 is more clear the 
impact of the bidding behavior. For instance, the impact can be noticed on the annual 
average market prices and on the standard deviation. The more the scheme is market 
oriented25 the higher is the average market price and smaller is the standard deviation. 
That is due to the bid prices of the RES-E, which are closer to bid of the conventional 
power stations. The biggest difference is between the GOT and the OM. The standard 
deviation in the GOT scheme is 18.8 €/MWh higher than in the OM, and the annual 
average energy price is 3.14 €/MWh higher in the OM. The considerations about the 
                                                 
25
 For the explanation of market oriented scheme see Appendix 1: Definitions. 
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minimum and maximum price are similar to the one in Section 4.4.1-General Market 
Parameters. In the schemes where the RES-E can bid at negative price, the number of 
hours where the clearing price is negative are not that different. But change the negativi-
ty of the market prices according the bidding behavior (see Figure 4.9), and this have a 
strong impact on the possibility to have revenues of the renewables generators as will 
explain in the following. 
Figure 4.9: Sorted market prices of the not the not flexible scenario 2030, enlargement of the last part. 
 
Source: own illustration. Data obtained with PowerACE. 
The most important finding concerns the yearly evolution of monthly average spot 
market price, see Figure 4.10 
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Figure 4.10: Monthly average market price, scenario 2030 not flexible. 
 
Source: own illustration. Data obtained with PowerACE. 
The bidding behaviour does not have a considerable impact on the total generation, 
because the renewables are anyway cheaper compared to the conventional technologies 
(see Section 4.2), but deeply affect the market prices, especially in the months where the 
feed-in of VRE are high (January to March for the wind power, and July and August for 
the solar power.  
Generally the market prices are higher compared to 2020 likely for: the higher CO2 
price, fuel prices and different conventional fleet (see Section 3). Furthermore the prices 
do not drop during May, June, and July as in 2020, likely due to the changes in the 
conventional fleet. The SP scheme compared to the GOT, that is the more market 
oriented, permits to have even in the months with high feed-in of wind, for example in 
March, prices definitely higher (in the SP scheme in March the monthly average energy 
price is 8.25 €/MWh higher than in the GOT scheme). 
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RE Parameters 
The RE parameters for the constant generators are not present in the next sections 
because they are less relevant compared to the VRE values.  
In the interest of simplicity, the monthly MVs and MVFs are presented just for the On 
shore wind and PV; Off shore wind and PVR are left out because they have similar 
behavior to the presented technologies. 
Annual Market Value 
Table 4.15: The Annual market values of the VREs in 2030, not flexible scenario. 
Support 
Scheme 
PVR PV 
Off 
shore 
wind 
On shore 
wind 
 
[€/MWh] [€/MWh] [€/MWh] [€/MWh] 
     
FIT 62.25 63.68 62.24 60.65 
GOT 59.54 59.54 59.38 56.82 
OM 65.37 65.35 65.90 64.52 
SP 64.59 65.35 64.77 63.38 
Source: Data obtained with PowerACE. 
The annual MVs for the fluctuating energy sources are shown in Table 4.15. In this 
scenario it is possible to asses the impact of the bidding behavior on the renewable 
generators.  
As the annually average market price, Table 4.14, even the annual MVs are higher when 
the support scheme is more market oriented. The reasons of this effect could be found 
on the higher bid price of the renewables.  
Higher MVs means, for the partially dispatchable generators, higher possibility to have 
incomes from the market. 
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Figure 4.11: Monthly MVs for On shore wind (left) and PV (right) 2030 not flexible scenario. 
 
Source: own illustration. Data obtained with PowerACE. 
The monthly evolution of the MV is shown in Figure 4.11. As could be expected, the 
bidding behaviour has even stronger impact on the monthly market values than to the 
average market prices. For instance, the wind value in the SP scheme is 15.34 €/MWh 
higher than in the GOT scheme whereas the market price difference is 8.25 €/MWh. 
The differences between the support schemes are higher in the months where the feed-in 
of renewables is high; likely because the REs are setting the hourly price mostly in these 
periods. As is explained in Section 3, the SP scheme simulates the German Market 
premium support scheme. The generators earn, for each MWh that they feed-in the grid, 
a premium that is in charge to the consumers. The premium is calculated as the FiT 
value minus the monthly market value. Hence higher monthly market value a smaller 
public cost to support the renewables. 
Annual Market Value Factor 
The annual MVFs of the fluctuating generators are shown in Table 4.16. The results 
show that, under considered assumptions, the annual MVFs are higher for the more 
market oriented schemes as OM and SP. 
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Table 4.16: The Annual MVFs of the VREs in 2030, not flexible scenario. 
Support 
Scheme 
PVR PV 
Off 
shore 
wind 
On 
shore 
wind 
 
[-] [-] [-] [-] 
     FIT 0.92 0.94 0.92 0.90 
GOT 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.86 
OM 0.94 0.94 0.95 0.93 
SP 0.94 0.95 0.94 0.92 
Source: Data obtained with PowerACE. 
In Figure 4.12 are shown the monthly development of the value factors for the On shore 
wind and the PV. Looking at Figure 4.12, the first consideration that could be done is 
that the market oriented support schemes, as SP and OM, give more stability and higher 
value during the year to the MVF of the VREs. Another interesting consideration is that 
the PV value factor during the summer does not drop down as in 2020 likely due to the 
more stability of the market prices (see Figure 4.10). 
Figure 4.12: Monthly MVFs for On shore wind (left) and PV (right), 2030 not flexible scenario. 
 
Source: own illustration. Data obtained with PowerACE. 
The effect of the of the more stability of the market price during year affect the annual 
market value of the solar power, see Figure 4.13. In the scenario 2020 not flexible, the 
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annual MVF is further from the monthly MVF´s curve than in 2030. In light of Equa-
tion 5 and Figure 4.10 is clear that this due average price during the summer months, 
where the generation of the solar power is high. 
Figure 4.13: Comparison PV MVFs of the scenarios 2020 and 2030 not flexible. 
 
Source: own illustration. Data obtained with PowerACE. 
4.5.2 Flexible scenario 
General Market Parameters 
Table 4.17: General Market parameters for the flexible scenario in 2030. 
Support 
Scheme 
Average 
Market 
Price 
Maximum 
Price 
Minimum 
Price 
Standard 
Deviation 
Negative 
price 
Hours 
 
[€/MWh] [€/MWh] [€/MWh] [€/MWh] [hours] 
      FIT 70.23 100 -83 14.7 42 
GOT 69.88 100 -150 18.6 42 
OM 70.65 100 0 11.3 0 
SP 70.52 100 -30 12.2 39 
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Source: Data obtained with PowerACE. 
Also in this scenario, the general market parameters show the impact on the spot prices 
of the bidding behaviours of the renewable. The effect is less visible compared to the 
not flexible scenario, because the renewables are less times setting the wholesale market 
price (see at the number of hours with negative price in Table 4.17; for an explanation 
why the number of hours with negative price can be use to asses the number of times 
where the renewable are setting the price see Section 4.1). Although the yearly average 
energy prices are not really different among the schemes, the impact on the energy 
market can be better seen from the monthly average market prices development (see 
Figure 4.14). 
 
Figure 4.14: Monthly average market prices of the scenario flexible, 2030. 
 
Source: own illustration. Data obtained with PowerACE. 
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RE Parameters 
Annual Market Value 
Table 4.18 Annual MVs of VREs of the scenario 2030 flexible. 
Support 
Scheme 
PVR PV 
Off 
shore 
wind 
On shore 
wind 
 
[€/MWh] [€/MWh] [€/MWh] [€/MWh] 
     FIT 66.21 66.66 66.67 65.59 
GOT 65.42 65.42 65.68 64.66 
OM 67.11 67.11 67.63 66.61 
SP 66.85 67.11 67.32 66.27 
Source:. Data obtained with PowerACE. 
Although the small number of hours where occurs the negative prices, the bid support 
scheme has considerable effect on the monthly MVs especially on the solar value. 
Figure 4.15: Monthly MV´s curves of the scenario 2030 flexible. 
 
Source: own illustration. Data obtained with PowerACE. 
Annual Market Value Factor 
The annual market value factors are presented in Table 4.18. The effect of the support 
policy is easier to be asses from Figure 4.17 that shows the monthly evolution of the 
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monthly MVFs. Differently from 2020, the solar value factor do not drop during the 
summer months due to the more stability of the market prices. 
Figure 4.16: Annual MVs of the fluctuating REs in 2030, flexible scenario. 
Support 
Scheme 
PVR PV Off 
shore 
wind 
On 
shore 
wind 
 [-] [-] [-] [-] 
     
FIT 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.94 
GOT 0.94 0.94 0.95 0.93 
OM 0.95 0.95 0.96 0.95 
SP 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.94 
Source: Data obtained with PowerACE. 
Figure 4.17: The monthly MVF´s curves for On shore wind (left) and PV (right). Scenario: 2030 flexible.  
 
Source: own illustration. Data obtained with PowerACE. 
4.6 Summary 
The results, within the considered assumption, shown that the policy design do not 
considerably affect the renewables dispatched generation of the VREs. Anyway, with a 
higher penetration of renewables, the policy design may affect even the dispatched 
generation. 
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In 2020 the impact of the design on the power market can not be clearly assessed. This 
is due to the still low share of renewable energies. 
In 2030 the impact on the market can be assessed. The design of the support scheme has 
a big effect on the electricity prices (see Figure 4.10 and Figure 4.14). The variation of 
the average market price is reflected in the market value of the VREs (see Figure 4.11 
and Figure 4.15). The bidding behavior affects differently the arithmetic spot market 
means and the MVs. The MV is influenced even by the generation, and the merit-order 
effect is higher when high in-feed of fluctuating energy occurs. In other words, when 
the generation of the fluctuating energy sources is high than the price is lower, therefore 
the MV is more influenced than the average means from the bidding behavior. The 
MVF (Figure 4.12 and Figure 4.17) can be used to assess the relative changes between 
the arithmetic prices means and the MVs. More the residual system is inflexible more 
the renewable bidding behavior have higher effects on the MV than to the arithmetic 
mean of the energy prices. This can be seen in Figure 4.12 and Figure 4.17, in the not 
flexible scenario the bidding behavior has higher influence of the MVFs. The biding 
behavior has even a strong effect on the fluctuation of the spot market prices, in the not 
flexible scenario the difference on the standard deviation in 2030 for the not flexible is 
ca. 15 €/MWh. 
The bidding behavior has a stronger effect on the solar technologies than the wind 
power; this could be due by their different generation profiles, the solar generation is 
more concentrate in some hours of the day than the wind power. 
The flexibility gained by removing the reserve in the spot market appears to blur the 
effect of the bidding behavior, but it could have more visible impact on higher share of 
the renewables. This means that the bidding behavior increase the flexibility of the 
system mainly in the periods where occurs low residual demand whereas the “thermal 
must-run” affect all the system (see Section 2).From the results, emerge that in the 
scenario of 2030 the dispatchable renewable generators react to the high in-feed of 
VREs. Anyway, due to the assumption (Section 3), they represent a small share of the 
total install capacity; consequentially they have not the ability to exert a considerable 
dampening effect on the high fluctuation of the residual demand.  
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5 Discussion 
As introduced in section 4.6, the main effects of the market designs are visible in the 
electricity prices instead of the renewable dispatched generation. 
According (Sensfuß F. et al., 2008) , (Hirth, 2013 ), and (Nicolosi, 2011), the type of the 
conventional fleet, fuel and CO2 prices, interconnections among inter/intra-national 
markets have a big influence on the market price (section 2 gives an overview of the 
impact of these factors on the market price). The aim of the work at hand is not to asses 
the single impacts of those parameters on the market prices but rather to asses the 
impact of the RES-E bidding behavior on the market price and how they interact with 
the other parameters. 
The sorted market price curves for the SP and GOT schemes are in Figure 5.1, the FIT 
and OM sorted market price curves are not shown because they are similar to the ones 
presented. From the figures is clear that the first part of the curves, until the drop of the 
price, is not influenced by the bidding behaviors because is the same for all the schemes. 
Hence, the first part of the curve is just influenced by the other effects. 
The combination of the more flexible conventional fleet, the higher CO2 and fuel prices 
makes the energy prices higher and more stable in the scenarios with 2030 as base year. 
Moreover the high prices have a longer duration in 2030 than in 2020. Due to the high 
share of gas. Thus the price is mostly set by the same technology. 
The results suggest that the interconnection with the reserve market has a small influ-
ence, in absolute terms, on the spot market prices; but it increases the high prices 
duration (the flexible scenarios, compared to the not flexible scenarios with the same 
base year, are more shift on the right side of the area chart). 
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Figure 5.1: Energy price duration curves of the SP scheme (top) and GOT scheme (bottom). 
 
 
  
Source: own illustration, data obtained with PowerACE model. 
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The contractions of the power plants for the reserve influence the overall flexibility of 
the system. The “must-run” due to reserve market interconnections has a stronger effect 
on the scenario with base year 2020. This is due likely to the capacity different capacity 
mix of the conventional fleet. In 2020 the share of base load plants is higher than in 
2030, therefore the overall flexibility of the system is much lower in 2020. The base 
load plants has normally high installed capacity per plant, therefore their obligation to 
be online all the month have a different effect on overall flexibility of the wholesale 
market. Figure 5.2 represent the enlargement of the right side of the prices duration 
curve, where the spot prices drop. This part of the curve represents the oversupply 
periods (the theoretical framework of the oversupply situations is present in section 2). 
The oversupply situations frequency decreases with the flexible scenarios as they do not 
have the “must-run” generation see Figure 5.2. 
Figure 5.2: Enlargement of the energy price duration curves for the simulation with 2030 as base year. 
 
Source: own illustration. Data obtained with PowerACE. 
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The bidding behaviour has impact on the market prices during the oversupply situations. 
Since the overall flexibility of the system is mainly required in the period of high or low 
residual demand, is clear how is important that the bidding behaviour of the renewables 
is harmonize with the market in a order to achieve a flexible and effective system with a 
high share of renewable energies. Although these situations represent a small number of 
hours on the entire year, with high penetration of VREs26, the market prices are strongly 
influenced by these hours, (the monthly average market prices in 2030 are show in 
Figure 4.14 and Figure 4.10) and consequentially by the support scheme design. The 
more market-oriented schemes cause fewer distortions to the merit-order curve because 
their bid prices are closer to the conventional bids, furthermore the RES-E generators 
are part of the supply curve thus in case of oversupply situation if they are not called to 
produce because their bid price is to high for the demand, than they cut on their produc-
tion without any out of market curtailment rule. Therefore in the periods of high in-feed 
of fluctuating renewables the monthly average market price curve is less influenced. 
The consequence is higher prices in the hours where there is high generation of renew-
ables, which is translatable as higher MV for the VREs (Figure 4.11 and Figure 4.15 
shown the market value of on shore wind and the PV). In other words, the more market-
based designs make the electricity price higher and consequentially also the MV of the 
VREs. The market value expresses the possibility to have revenue from the market for a 
specific energy source, whereas the value factor is useful for comparing the value of a 
fluctuating energy source with the constant one (see Section 4.1). 
The relative effect between the market price and the MV can be asses with the monthly 
MVFs (the value factors for on shore wind and PV in 2030 are shown in Figure 4.12 
and Figure 4.17). The monthly MVFs show that the more market-based schemes has 
higher effect on the market revenue possibilities of the fluctuating renewable energy 
sources than on the average market price. This means that the fluctuating renewables 
became more favourable in the market if they are supported with a more market-
                                                 
26
 The scenarios with 2030 as base year have higher RES-E capacity installed. The assumptions and 
input data are presented in section 3. 
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oriented scheme. For instance, in March the MVF, under the SP not flexible scenario, is 
ca. 90% whereas with the GOT not flexible is ca. 75%. 
Nonetheless the German Market Premium is based on the monthly market value factor 
many of the ongoing discussion are focused on the annual market value of the partially 
dispatchable renewable energy sources, i.e. (Hirth, 2013 ). As explained in section 4, the 
annual and monthly market values are both weighted averages of relative energy price 
but with different basis price. Equation 5 shows how to derive the annual MVF from the 
monthly MVFs. The monthly value and value factor are more useful to asses the real 
possibility of income for the variable renewable sources, as their generation is deeply 
changing among the year, whereas the annual parameters give an overview of the 
overall response of the market. Figure gives an overview of the deployment of the 
annual MVF for the solar and wind technology on their penetration on the overall 
demand. 
Figure 5.3:The annual market value factors for wind and solar. 
 
Source: Data obtained with PowerACE. The values are presented in section 4. 
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The MVFs of the “general technology”, solar and wind, are calculated as arithmetic 
mean of the particular one (on shore and off shore wind; PV and PVR). The penetration 
rate is calculated as sum of the singular penetrations.  
In 2020 the solar value factor is not influenced by the bidding behaviour as its penetra-
tion rate is quite small. But the effect of the bidding behaviour on the solar power is 
visible in the scenarios with 2030 as base year. Generally, the solar MVF is steeply 
rising in 2030 due to more flexible residual system. As explained in section 5, the more 
flexible residual system permits to keep in line the monthly average energy price even 
during the summer, whereas in 2020 the price was dropping due to high in-feed of the 
solar power. The only scheme that had not high increase of the annual market value is 
the not flexible GOT that has ca.5% percentage point less than the other schemes, that 
means that is the bidding behaviour of the GOT that affect the possibility to have 
revenue for the solar energies.  
The influence of the flexibility on the MVFs due to the reserve interconnections on the 
annual wind is visible in all the scenarios. The effect is stronger in 2020 due to the less 
overall flexibility of the supply system.  
The effect of the bidding behaviour is visible on the wind value factors of the scenarios 
with 2030 as base year, likely due to the higher penetration of the wind and the conse-
quentially higher oversupply situations frequency. The scheme that presents the higher 
annual wind MVF is the OM flexible, and the not flexible GOT has the lower one, with 
ca. 7% point less. 
As all the design decision the benefit can be monetised, in this dissertation the costs for 
support the renewable are considered.  
The Open Market scheme has no costs for the consumers related to the output of the 
RES-E and the market price is not reduce therefore also the income of the conventional 
generators is not affected from this support scheme. Anyway, as explained in section 2, 
renewables have to be supported somehow for be competitive in the market, for exam-
ple as is advise in (Boute A., 2012) the renewables could be supported with a capacity-
based scheme. In the work at hand there are no possibilities to compare quantitatively 
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the cost of the OM with the other schemes. The support level is not directly related to 
the revenues from the market therefore supporting the renewable on the installed 
capacity could easily leads to over-/under-compensations to the generators. This kind of 
remuneration has to include a high risk premium, because the generators are completely 
exposed to the market price fluctuation.  
In the SP, FIT, and GOT the support of the renewables is based on the feed-in in the 
grid. The GOT is a feed-in tariff support mechanism where the generators gets a fix 
tariff for every energy unit in-feed in the grid, the generators also enjoy the “grid 
priority” therefore they are largely dispatched. The FIT scheme can be seen as a fixed 
premium scheme, where the generators earn a fixed premium on top of the market 
revenues. The premium that the generators earn is exactly as the tariff that the genera-
tors earn under the GOT scheme, but they have to participate in the market. The SP is a 
sliding premium scheme, means that the generator ´s premium is variable, and is 
varying according the market revenues of the renewable generators. Higher they are 
their revenues from the market lower is their support compensation. 
The GOT and the FIT have the same cost for the consumers but the GOT permits less 
saving for the generators side cause of the lower average market price (higher merit-
order effect). The savings for the generators side can be asses as difference on the 
annual average market price times the annual conventional generation. Under the FIT 
instead of the GOT scheme the savings for the conventional generators side, in the not 
flexible scenarios 2030, are ca. 400 millions of Euros higher. 
The dynamic variability of the premium in the scenario permits savings for the consum-
ers that can be asses as annual MV times the annual generation. In the scenario with 
2030 as base year and the renewable can participate in the reserve market (flexible 
scenario), the MV reduces the costs for support the renewables of ca. 20 billions of 
Euros.  
The possibility for the renewables to be completely integrated in the reserve market 
reduces the support cost for the consumers and increases the generator ´s savings. The 
savings that can be obtained without the interconnection with the reserve market are 
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higher when the support scheme is less flexible. For instance the increase of the genera-
tors savings due to the flexibility of the reserve market in the SP scheme is ca. 700 
millions of Euros whereas if the support scheme is the GOT than the savings is ca. 1 
billion of Euros. 
The SP permits higher annual average market price than the FIT and GOT, therefore 
higher conventional generator ´s savings. For instance the generator´s savings between 
the SP and GOT, in 2030 not flexible, are estimated to ca. 800 millions of Euros. 
In summary, the results of this analysis suggest that the sliding-premium (SP) scheme 
has high potential. Compare to the GOT (feed-in tariff with grid priority) and FIT 
(“fixed premium”) 
1. permits higher savings to both the consumers and conventional generators due 
to the variability of the premium, although it keep the income flow to the re-
newable generators constant; 
2. As a more market-oriented support scheme permits less distortion on the devel-
opment of the market prices (smaller merit-order effect); 
3. Present higher flexibility in the periods of low residual demand; 
4. The higher initially costs due to the management premium are estimate to be 
2.7 billions of Euros27, therefore are covers to the reduction of the support costs 
due to the variable premium. 
5. Compared to the GOT the renewable generators under the FIT and the SP are 
active in the market to prevent the oversupply situations. 
Compare to the OM (the renewables bid into the market at their marginal costs): 
1. There is no metric parameters to compare the costs of the OM should be base on 
other parameters out of the market (i.e. capacity reward); 
                                                 
27
 The fixed management premium for the fluctuating technologies in 2013 was 12 €/MWh and 2.75 
€/MWh for the non-fluctuating .The fixed part of the premium will decrease in the upcoming years 
due to learning effect of the market actors (Klobasa et al., 2013). But this value are used for a safer 
valuation. 
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2. In the OM the externalization from the market of the supports could make more 
difficult analyse the effectiveness of the scheme, and therefore lead to under-
/over-compensation; 
3. Furthermore the negative bid price of the variable renewable energies mirrors 
the social value given to the renewables coupled with the un-storability of the 
electricity, in this way there could be a economic-merit competition between the 
conventional plants that are unwilling to reduce their load due to technical con-
strains and the renewable supported by the society. 
Moreover all the analysis show that the more flexibility due to the reserve market 
increase the total welfare. Although the technical problems to complete integrate the 
variable renewable energies in the reserve market due to their forecast issues, is seen 
important to integrate them at least in the secondary negative reserve. As a benchmark 
level for the variable renewable energies could be used the capacity credit. Furthermore 
the auctions for the energy reserves might be done more often in order to mitigate the 
uncertainty of the forecast.  
Also the intraday market should increase their liquidity in order to reduce the balancing 
costs. The impacts of the renewable in the power market could also be mitigate also by 
expanding the European grid infrastructure, or increase the storage possibility. 
A possibility for harmonizing the differences among the renewable energy sources, as 
constant and variable, could be to have different scheme per technology. For instance, 
the dispatchable generators could be directly marketed and they could be supported 
based on the capacity because they can react to the economic incentives as the conven-
tional. Whereas for the fluctuating energies cannot react just to the economic incentives 
therefore they have to be supported based on the output. Furthermore the variability of 
the premium ensures to not give overcompensation.  
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6 Conclusions 
6.1 Summary 
Due to environmental and competitiveness reasons the European Union decided to 
support the RES. Since then, the share of renewable energy in the power market is 
steadily increasing. 
Every European country has ambitious target to reach towards a low carbon economy. 
As the renewable energies in the market are in a not fair competition field, they have to 
be supported from the society in order to achieve the optimal level. 
As hydro potential is almost exploited and biofuel-fired plants are limited by sustain-
ability constraints much of the growth will need to come from wind and solar power, 
which are variable energy sources, in terms of output. 
The penetration of the renewable energies has a strong impact on the power market, 
especially the variable energy sources. The main impacts of the renewable on the power 
market are the reduction of the average utilization of the conventional fleet, the future 
investments on conventional technologies, reduction of the average market price and 
increase the volatility of the spot market prices. 
Since Germany has a thermal power system, as many other European countries, the 
integration of the renewable has even more severe impacts than countries with a high 
share of hydro power with possibility of storage the energy. Therefore Germany is 
considered a good research case for study the integration of the renewables. 
The negative correlation of RES-E in-feed and the power prices have already been 
discussed in the literature, and this is known as merit-order effect. The volume of the 
merit-order effect is influenced by other factors as the CO2 price, fuels cost, and the 
type of the conventional fleet.  
Many mechanisms are suitable for support the renewables in the electricity market. In 
the literature seems that one of the important features of a support scheme is the com-
patibility with the liberalized market, the schemes more compatible are called market-
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oriented support schemes. The type of support mechanism influences the power market 
in two ways: different capacity installations, thus different renewable portfolios, and the 
way in which renewables participate in the electricity market. Recent studies analysed 
the impact due to different installation and contrary to the expectations the more market 
oriented scheme does necessarily have less impact on the market prices. To the author´s 
knowledge there is no quantitative studies about the impact on the market prices due to 
the bidding behaviour of the renewable energies, therefore is considered important to 
seek to fill the knowledge lack with an empirical study.  
As power systems increase in complexity due to higher shares of intermitting RES-E, is 
also increasing the requirements for power system modeling. With Germany as example, 
this dissertation seeks to discuss to what degree the impact on the electricity price due to 
the increasing RES-E share could be mitigate with a more market oriented support 
scheme. 
The support schemes analyzed were: the German market premium, the feed-in tariff 
scheme, fixed premium, and a scheme where the support to the renewables were not 
given from the output, therefore the renewable just bid their marginal costs.  
6.2  Contributions 
The results suggest that the sliding-premium scheme have high potential. Compared to 
the feed-in tariff and fixed premium permits to have higher savings to both the consum-
ers and conventional generators, although it keeps the income flow to the renewable 
generators constant. The sliding-premium generates less distortion on the development 
of the market prices (smaller merit-order effect); and gives to market higher flexibility 
in the periods of oversupply. The main critic that is move to the sliding feed-in premium 
is the higher initial costs due to the management premium that has to be born from the 
consumers. The results show that the reduction of the costs for the scheme from the 
feed-in tariff or fixed premium is ca. 20 billions in 2030, whereas the evaluated cost for 
the management premium are approximately 2.7 billions of Euros.  
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For the comparison to the open market scheme there are no metric parameters in terms 
of costs. Anyway also in the open market scheme the renewable have to be support in 
other ways (i.e. capacity reward).  
The externalization from the market of the supports cost could make more difficult 
analyse the effectiveness of the scheme, and therefore lead to under-/over-compensation 
due to the different revenues. As the “open market support scheme” permits higher 
consumer´s savings, because of the decrease of the merit-order effect and the absence 
negative bid, could be implemented a mixed support mechanisms where for the constant 
generators is reward the capacity and the fluctuating renewable energy are supported by 
the sliding premium. 
Moreover, were analysed the effect on the spot market of the reserve market intercon-
nection. The more flexibility due to the reserve market increases the total welfare and 
reduces the cost of the support scheme. Differently from the bidding behaviour of the 
renewable the higher flexibility due the reserve does not impact on the market prices 
just in the oversupply situations. The flexibility due to the reserve has higher effect on 
the short-run optimize system, because of the higher share of big base load plants in the 
conventional mix. Although the technical problems to completely integrate the variable 
renewable energies in the reserve market, due to their forecast issues, is seen important 
to integrate them at least in the secondary negative reserve. As a benchmark level for 
the variable renewable energies could be used i.e. the capacity credit. Furthermore the 
auctions for the energy reserves might be done more often in order to mitigate the 
uncertainty of the forecast. Also the intraday market should increase their liquidity in 
order to reduce the balancing costs. The impacts of the renewable in the power market 
could also be mitigate also by expanding the European grid infrastructure, or increase 
where is possible and economic the storage capacity. 
From the author point of view is also important to notice that from the results is clear 
that higher is the flexibility of the residual system lower is the effect of the increasing 
flexibility due to the support mechanism or the reserve market. Nonetheless this consid-
eration the power market has still to improve to integrate high share of intermittent 
renewable energy sources therefore every increase of flexibility is considered important. 
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6.3 Limitations of analysis 
The assumption on the PowerACE model to real word situations in many ways, the 
most important are: 
1. In the real word the demand is not completely traded in the spot market, in 
2010 was 44.9% of the total( Winkler J., 2011); 
2. There is no forecast errors in the generation of the renewable, as the hourly pro-
file is input; 
3. The market value for the calculations of the sliding premium bid is calculate 
with the forecast that are calculate with the GOT scheme- In this way the re-
newable generators expect lower income than what they will receive, therefore 
the bid is lower than how would be if the forecast would be calculate according 
the sliding premium mechanism. 
4. For reasons of time were not carry out a sensitive analysis. For instance, could 
be assumed different fuels costs or weather conditions for assess the confidence 
of the results. 
6.4 Future Work 
The work for this analysis could be utilized in many other ways. The new part of the 
model was designed to be easily adapted to new bidding behaviour of the renewable. 
Furthermore the code is already operative for all Europe, therefore can be better carry 
out analysis about the harmonization of different support scheme across Europe.  
As remembered in the limitations, the sliding premium model uses the forecast that is 
calculated by using the GOT to sell the RES-E generation. Therefore a future improve-
ment could be to reiterate the program automatically and uses the result as a forecast. 
With this two mechanisms could be asses in what degrees the forecast errors of the 
renewable impact on the market prices. 
With this new part could be test quantitative new parameters, i.e. the value of the feed-
in tariff, in what degree they impact the market revenues of the renewable. 
  
Appendix 
93 
7 Appendix 
Appendix 1: Definitions. 
Term Definition or Explanation 
Biomass 
In the simulations correspond to biomass, 
biogas, bioliquid and waste. 
Biogas 
In the simulations correspond to landfill 
gas, sewage gas, mine gas. 
Residual Demand 
The renewables are mostly dispatched, for 
their low variable costs and for the support 
policy designs. Moreover the VREs 
increase the fluctuation of the demand. 
Use the residual demand, calculate as total 
demand minus the RES-E dispatched, is 
useful to asses the challenges that has to 
face the conventional supply power 
system. 
Levelized Costs of Energy (LCOE)  
LCOE is determined by dividing the 
project’s total cost of operation by the 
energy generated during the supposed life 
time of the plant. The total cost of 
operation should include all costs that the 
project incurs (including construction and 
operation). Incentives for project construc-
tion and energy generation can also be 
incorporated. 
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Dispatchable/constant renewable energy 
sources  
Biofuel-fired plants, hydro power, and 
geothermal power are usually called 
dispatchable/constant renewable energy 
sources. For the biofuel and the geother-
mal is understandable why the input is 
considerable constant. For the hydro 
power the output depend on the seasonal 
water level in the rivers. However, an 
analysis of published data suggests that the 
market value of the hydro power can be 
assumed constant (Klobasa et al., 2013) 
Appendix 2: FiT values. 
Year 
On shore 
wind 
Off shore 
wind 
Geo-
thermal 
Hydro Biogas PVR PV 
Bio-
mass 
 
[€/MWh] [€/MWh] [€/MWh] [€/MWh] [€/MWh] [€/MWh] [€/MWh] [€/MWh] 
         
2000 91.01 91.01 80.53 73.20 72.72 506.18 506.18 176.10 
2001 91.01 91.01 80.53 72.90 72.72 506.18 506.18 180.97 
2002 91.01 91.01 80.53 72.68 72.72 480.87 480.87 178.32 
2003 91.01 91.01 80.53 72.83 72.72 456.84 456.84 170.14 
2004 87.00 91.00 115.03 77.02 68.42 563.79 457.00 88.09 
2005 85.30 91.00 115.03 77.96 66.59 533.69 434.15 91.34 
2006 83.60 91.00 115.03 84.29 65.59 505.89 405.93 89.97 
2007 81.90 91.00 115.03 75.90 64.61 478.67 379.54 89.04 
2008 80.30 89.20 115.03 82.77 63.64 454.66 354.87 86.30 
2009 92.00 150.00 132.50 87.38 66.02 412.47 324.70 87.67 
2010 91.08 150.00 131.18 69.23 65.47 344.47 269.83 88.57 
2011 90.17 150.00 129.87 91.84 64.93 271.65 213.35 87.50 
2012 89.30 190.00 250.00 94.94 63.08 189.32 143.22 203.96 
2013 87.96 190.00 250.00 81.21 62.13 142.95 106.39 199.88 
2014 89.00 194.00 252.00 81.58 60.73 119.37 94.70 129.41 
2015 89.00 194.00 252.00 81.58 60.04 115.64 90.47 129.41 
2016 88.64 194.00 239.40 81.17 59.14 108.89 85.19 128.76 
2017 87.23 194.00 227.43 80.76 58.26 102.54 80.21 126.21 
2018 85.85 194.00 216.06 80.36 57.38 96.55 75.53 123.70 
2019 84.48 194.00 205.26 79.96 56.52 90.91 71.12 121.25 
2020 83.14 154.00 194.99 79.56 55.67 85.61 66.97 118.84 
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Source: See section 3  
Appendix 3: Renewable Capacity used for the simulations. 
 
Hydro 
Power 
On 
shore 
wind 
Off 
shore 
wind 
PVR PV Geothermal Biogas Biomass 
 
[MW] [MW] [MW] [MW] [MW] [MW] [MW] [MW] 
         
1990 3982 55 0 2 0 0 64 615 
1991 4033 106 0 2 0 0 69 616 
1992 4049 174 0 6 0 0 72 617 
1993 4117 326 0 9 0 0 99 639 
1994 4211 618 0 12 0 0 124 583 
1995 4348 1121 0 18 0 0 138 598 
1996 4305 1549 0 28 0 0 153 659 
1997 4296 2089 0 26 16 0 167 661 
1998 4369 2877 0 54 0 0 283 718 
1999 4547 4435 0 70 0 0 305 798 
2000 4831 6097 0 114 0 0 321 967 
2001 4831 8738 0 176 0 0 327 1085 
2002 4937 11976 0 296 0 0 341 1274 
2003 4953 14593 0 435 0 0 361 1969 
2004 5186 16612 0 824 281 0 397 2233 
2005 5210 18375 0 1567 489 0 409 3117 
2006 5193 20568 0 2270 629 0 422 3861 
2007 5137 22183 0 2772 1398 3 434 4289 
2008 5164 23815 0 4101 2019 3 446 4810 
2009 5340 25632 60 5615 4951 8 456 5539 
2010 5407 27012 168 9372 8163 8 432 6167 
2011 5625 28857 203 13360 11679 8 367 6781 
2012 5607 30996 308 15510 17133 12 354 7183 
2013 5613 33757 903 17080 18868 31 350 7736 
2014 5611 36257 1787 18268 20180 48 373 7836 
2015 5676 38757 2570 19456 21492 70 384 7936 
2016 5740 41257 3354 20644 22804 98 396 8036 
2017 5804 43757 4137 21832 24116 133 408 8136 
2018 5869 46257 4921 23020 25428 176 420 8236 
2019 5933 48757 5704 24207 26741 227 431 8336 
2020 5997 51257 6500 24707 27293 289 443 8436 
2021 6062 53757 7350 24707 27293 289 455 8536 
2022 6126 56257 8200 24707 27293 289 466 8636 
2023 6190 58757 9050 24707 27293 289 478 8736 
2024 6255 61257 9900 24707 27293 289 490 8836 
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2025 6319 63757 10750 24707 27293 289 501 8936 
2026 6383 66257 11600 24707 27293 289 513 9036 
2027 6448 68757 12450 24707 27293 289 525 9136 
2028 6512 71257 13300 24707 27293 289 537 9236 
2029 6576 73757 14150 24707 27293 289 548 9336 
2030 6641 76257 15000 24707 27293 289 560 9436 
 
Source: Own illustration and calculation. Historical data from 1990 to 2013 retrieved from (AGEE stat, 
2014 ) based on (BMWi, 2014). 
Appendix 4: Renewable generation used for the simulations. 
 
Hydro 
On 
shore 
wind 
Off 
shore 
wind 
PVR PV Geothermal Biogas Biomass 
 
[GWh] [GWh] [GWh] [GWh] [GWh] [GWh] [GWh] [GWh] 
         
1990 14910 71 0 1 0 0 217 1218 
1991 12627 100 0 1 0 0 249 1222 
1992 14733 275 0 4 0 0 279 1279 
1993 15179 600 0 3 0 0 396 1239 
1994 16951 909 0 7 0 0 512 1363 
1995 18671 1500 0 7 0 0 559 1451 
1996 18729 2032 0 12 0 0 606 1492 
1997 14845 2966 0 11 7 0 653 1620 
1998 14760 4489 0 35 0 0 1310 1946 
1999 16881 5528 0 30 0 0 1454 2131 
2000 18828 9513 0 60 0 0 1517 3214 
2001 19749 10509 0 76 0 0 1483 3731 
2002 20096 15786 0 162 0 0 1548 4500 
2003 15087 18713 0 313 0 0 1748 7093 
2004 16909 25509 0 416 141 0 1974 8497 
2005 16276 27229 0 977 305 0 2164 12190 
2006 16574 30710 0 1738 482 0 2149 16551 
2007 17566 39713 0 2044 1031 0 2042 22321 
2008 16961 40574 0 2962 1458 18 1958 25834 
2009 15886 38610 38 3498 3085 19 1919 28659 
2010 17265 37619 174 6262 5454 28 1877 32430 
2011 14659 48315 568 10458 9141 19 1908 35695 
2012 18036 49948 722 12534 13846 25 1852 42781 
2013 17596 52430 970 14254 15746 40 1820 46080 
2014 20510 58086 2794 14217 15705 104 1938 45816 
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2015 20763 62523 4025 15432 17047 152 1999 46401 
2016 21016 67015 5260 16682 18428 213 2060 46986 
2017 21268 71564 6499 17968 19848 289 2121 47570 
2018 21520 76167 7742 19289 21307 382 2182 48155 
2019 21772 80827 8989 20645 22806 493 2243 48740 
2020 22023 85542 10259 21440 23684 628 2304 49324 
2021 22274 90313 11619 21809 24091 628 2364 49909 
2022 22525 95140 12983 22178 24499 628 2425 50494 
2023 22775 100022 14351 22547 24906 628 2486 51078 
2024 23025 104960 15723 22915 25313 628 2547 51663 
2025 23275 109954 17100 23284 25721 628 2608 52248 
2026 23524 115003 18481 23653 26128 628 2669 52832 
2027 23773 120108 19866 24022 26535 628 2729 53417 
2028 24022 125269 21255 24390 26943 628 2790 54002 
2029 24270 130485 22648 24759 27350 628 2851 54587 
2030 24518 135757 24046 25128 27757 628 2912 55171 
Source: Own illustration and calculation. Historical data from 1990 to 2013 retrieved from (AGEE stat, 
2014 ) based on (BMWi, 2014). 
Appendix 5: Monthly generation of the Biomass (right) and Geothermal power (left). 
 
Source: Own Calculation. Data obtained with PowerACE model. 
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Appendix 6: Generation outlook in the hour within is reach the minimum price for the not flexible 
scenario in year 2020 and FIT support scheme  
Technology 
Generation 
[MWh] 
Hour 2148 
  Biogas 24 
Biomass 5631 
Demand -60358 
Gas 0 
Geothermal 72 
Hard Coal 4823 
Hydro Power 2423 
Lignite 4918 
Import/Export -4296 
Nuclear 0 
Oil 0 
PVR 14443 
Pump Storage -8996 
PV 15632 
Waste 0 
Off shore 
wind 
2825 
On shore 
wind 
22860 
Source: PowerACE model. 
Appendix 7: Generation outlook in the hours within is reach the minimum price for the not flexible 
scenario in year 2020 and SP support scheme 
Technology 
Generation 
[MWh] 
Hour 2148 2149 
   Biogas 0 0 
Biomass 5631 5631 
Demand -60358 -58656 
Gas 0 0 
Geothermal 72 72 
Hard Coal 4823 4823 
Hydro Power 2124 2337 
Lignite 4918 4918 
Import/Export -4296 -4394 
Nuclear 0 0 
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Oil 0 0 
PVR 14443 13488 
Pump Storage -8996 -8996 
PV 15955 14900 
Waste 0 0 
Off shore 
wind 
2825 2906 
On shore 
wind 
22860 22971 
Source: PowerACE model. 
Appendix 8: Generation outlook in the hours within is reach the minimum price for the not flexible 
scenario in year 2020 and no support scheme for the RES (OM). 
Technology 
Generation 
[MWh] 
Hour 2148 2149 
   Biogas 144 192 
Biomass 4073 4239 
Demand -60358 -58656 
Gas 0 0 
Geothermal 72 72 
Hard Coal 4823 4823 
Hydro Power 2514 2514 
Lignite 4918 4918 
Import/Export -4296 -4394 
Nuclear 0 0 
Oil 0 0 
PVR 14443 13488 
Pump Storage -8996 -8996 
PV 15955 14900 
Waste 1023 1023 
Off shore 
wind 
2825 2906 
On shore 
wind 
22860 22971 
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Appendix 9: Bidding behaviour algorithm for the RE bidder that bid directly in the Open Market. 
private void generateOMBid(int h,RenewableTechnology rTech,int year){ 
price=rTech.mc.get(DateManager.getCurrentYear()); 
volume=-rTech.loadProfile.get(year)[24*(getCurrentDayOfYear(h)-
1)+h]; 
} 
Source: Own Research. 
Appendix 10: Bidding behaviour algorithm for the RE bidder supported by the Feed in Tariff mechanism. 
private void generateFITBid(int h,RenewableTechnology rTech,Integer 
year){ 
if (!(rTech.FiT.get(year) == 0)) { 
 price = rTech.FiT.get(year); 
 } else { 
  price = rTech.mc.get(DateManager.getCurrentYear()); 
 } 
 price = -price; 
volume = -rTech.loadProfile.get(year)[24*(getCurrentDayOfYear(h)-
1)+h]; 
} 
Source: Own Research. 
Appendix 11: Bidding behaviour algorithm for the RE bidder supported by the Sliding Premium 
mechanism. 
private void generateSPBid(int h,RenewableTechnology rTech,Region 
region,Integer year){ 
if(!(rTech.FiT.get(year)==0)){ 
  price=(float)(rTech.FiT.get(year)- 
 (monthlyAvarageMarketPricesForecast.get(region)* 
 *relativeMarketValue.get(region).get(rTech))); 
   }else{ 
  price = rTech.mc.get(DateManager.getCurrentYear()); 
   } 
   price=-price; 
   price=rTech.mc.get(DateManager.getCurrentYear())+price; 
 volume=-Tech.loadProfile.get(year)[24*(getCurrentDayOfYear(h)-1)+h]; 
} 
Source: Own Research. 
Appendix 12: PowerACE ´s method that generate the hourly bid from the renewable generators 
according their bidding behaviour  
public ArrayList<BidPoint> callForBidsSpot(){ 
hBids.clear (); 
for (int h = 0; h < 24; h++) { 
  for(Region region:DataManagerRegions.scenarioRegions.values()){ 
   if (region.supportSchemeType.toLowerCase().equals("sp")){ 
    generateMonthlyForecastBaseYear (h); 
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   } 
for(RenewableTechnology 
rTech:region.renewableTechnologies.values()){ 
for (Integer 
year:rTech.installedCapacityPerYear.keySet()){  
    hBids.add(generateHBid(h, region, rTech, year)); 
    } 
   } 
} 
} 
return hBids; 
} 
Source: Own Research. 
Appendix 13: PowerACE´s Method for generate the installed capacity per year profile from the total 
capacity profile. 
public static void splitCapacityboolean isRefill) { 
for (Region region:DataManagerRegions.scenarioRegions.values()){ 
for (RenewableTechnology 
rTech:region.renewableTechnologies.values()){ 
HashMap<Integer,Float>installedCapacity=new  
HashMap<Integer,Float>(); 
   int firstYear=java.util.Collections.min( 
rTech.installedCapacityPerYear.keySet()); 
   float control = 0f; 
installedCapacity.put(firstYear, 
rTech.installedCapacityPerYear.get(firstYear)); 
   for(int year=firstYear+1; 
year<=DateManager.getCurrentYear();year++){ 
    installedCapacity.put(year,0f); 
    int lastYear = (year - 1); 
//check if, in order to not have negative installed  
// capacity per year 
if((rTech.installedCapacityPerYear.get(year)-
rTech.installedCapacityPerYear.get((lastYear)) < 0)) { 
    //some plants were shut off. 
float debt= 
rTech.installedCapacityPerYear.get(year)-
rTech.installedCapacityPerYear.get((lastYear)); 
     installedCapacity.put(year, 0f); 
//Hp: here is assumed the order”first in first out” 
//of the “power plants”        
     int anno = firstYear; 
      while (debt < 0 && anno < year) { 
       if ((installedCapacity.get(anno) + debt)<0){ 
        debt += installedCapacity.get(anno); 
        installedCapacity.put(anno, 0f); 
       } else { 
        installedCapacity.put( 
anno,installedCapacity.get(anno)+debt); 
       debt = 0; 
       } 
      anno++; 
      } 
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     installedCapacity.put( 
year,(rTech.installedCapacityPerYear.get(year)-
rTech.installedCapacityPerYear.get((lastYear)))); 
    } 
//update installedCapacityPerYear     
for (int year=firstYear; 
year<=DateManager.getCurrentYear();year++){ 
    rTech.installedCapacityPerYear.put( 
year,installedCapacity.get(year)); 
   } 
  } 
} 
} 
Source: Own Research. 
Appendix 14: PowerACE´s Method that readapt the installed capacity per year with the assumed life time 
of the plants (20 years). 
public static void fixLifeTime() { 
 for (Region region : DataManagerRegions.scenarioRegions.values()) { 
for (RenewableTechnology 
rTech:region.renewableTechnologies.values()) { 
   float control = 0; 
   int firstYear= 
java.util.Collections.min( 
rTech.installedCapacityPerYear.keySet()); 
   if (firstYear<(DateManager.getCurrentYear()-20)){ 
for(int year=firstYear; 
year<=(DateManager.getCurrentYear()-20); 
year++){ 
     float newCapacity= 
rTech.installedCapacityPerYear.get(year)+ 
rTech.installedCapacityPerYear.get(year+20); 
     rTech.installedCapacityPerYear.put( 
(year+20),newCapacity); 
     rTech.installedCapacityPerYear.remove(year); 
    } 
   } 
  } 
 } 
} 
Source: Own research. 
Appendix 15: PowerACE´s method for generate the hourly generation per every year from the total 
generation. 
public static void calculateAnnualRenewableLoad() { 
  DecimalFormat small = new DecimalFormat("##.0000"); 
  DecimalFormat big = new DecimalFormat("##"); 
  for (Region  
        region:DataManagerRegions.scenarioRegions.values()){ 
for (RenewableTechnology 
rTech:region.renewableTechnologies.values()) { 
    rTech.loadProfile = new HashMap<Integer, Float[]>(); 
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    for (int year:rTech.installedCapacityPerYear.keySet(){ 
     Float[]array=new Float 
[DateManager.getInstance().hoursInCurrentYear]; 
     Arrays.fill(array, 0f); 
     rTech.loadProfile.put(year, new  
       Float[DateManager.getInstance().hoursInCurrentYear]); 
     rTech.loadProfile.put(year, array); 
     if (!(rTech.installedCapacity == 0)) { 
double annualCoefficent = 
rTech.installedCapacityPerYear.get(year) / 
rTech.installedCapacity; 
      for (int h=0; 
h<DateManager.getInstance().hoursInCurrentYear; 
h++) { 
rTech.totalLoadProfile[h] = 
rTech.normalizedLoadProfile[h] * 
rTech.generation; 
       array[h]=(float)(annualCoefficent* 
rTech.totalLoadProfile[h]); 
      } 
     } 
     rTech.loadProfile.put(year, array); 
    }// years loop  
    if (!(rTech.installedCapacity == 0)) { 
   }//tech loop 
  } 
 } 
 
Source: Own Research. 
Appendix 16: PowerACE method, generateHbid. 
private BidPoint generateHBid(int h, Region region, RenewableTechnol-
ogy rTech, int year) { 
  if (region.supportSchemeType == "") { 
   sysLog.warn("The scenario does not consider any support 
scheme thus the RES-load is sell in the open market at the marginal 
cost  "); 
   generateOMBid(h, rTech, year); 
  } else { 
   switch (region.supportSchemeType.toLowerCase()) { 
   //   Feed-in Tariff scheme 
   case "fit": 
    generateFITBid(h, rTech, year); 
    break; 
   case "om": 
    generateOMBid(h, rTech, year); 
    break; 
   //   Fixed premium scheme 
   case "fp": 
    generateFPBid(h, rTech, year); 
    break; 
   //          Sliding Premium  
   case "sp": 
    generateSPBid(h, rTech, region, year); 
    break; 
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   //          Open Market scheme 
   default: 
    generateOMBid(h, rTech, year); 
    break; 
   } 
  } 
  Integer anno = new Integer(year); 
Object bidderAgent = new String(rTech.name.toString() +  
" ,year of construction " + anno.toString()); 
return new BidPointSupply((byte) h, price, volume, region, bid-
derAgent); 
 
 } 
Source: Own Research. 
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